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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the global financial market has seen an abundant
increase in the use of credit derivatives; more specifically, the use of credit
default swaps (CDSs).' Investors wanted higher returns on their
investments while simultaneously reducing or maintaining the same risk
exposure, so in came the CDS contracts. CDSs permitted investors to
increase expected returns while limiting additional risk exposures by
protecting against debt default.2 Due to globalization, the international
capital markets have grown to incredible levels, allowing for CDS
transactions to occur daily when the parties involved have never met and
reside on opposite sides of the world. The assortment and amount of these
CDS transactions take many forms because the market is over-the-counter
(OTC) with minimal regulation, either national or international regulation.
This lack of regulation is what raises concerns regarding the CDS market,
especially since the onset of the 2007-08 global financial crisis.3
Prior to the financial crisis, government officials and business persons
have expressed aversion to the use of financial derivatives, including credit
derivatives such as CDSs. A famous quote, in 2004, by the largest
shareholder and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffett, articulates
his opposition to the financial derivatives market, "[I] view [derivatives] as
time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and the economic system
.... In [my] view, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction,
carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal. ' '4  While
some completely disagree with the use of derivatives, many agree that
1. See International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), Market Survey,
http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-historical-data.pdf (last visited July 19, 2009).
The beginning of 2001 had $631.50 billion in outstanding CDS contracts and the end of 2008 had $
38.56 trillion in outstanding CDS contracts, signifying a 6006 percent growth rate in the CDS market
over an eight-year period.
2. Terry Young, Linnea McCord & Peggy J. Crawford, Credit Default Swaps: The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly 1 (2009) (unpublished paper, prepared for the Ninth Annual IBER & TLC
Conference Proceedings 2009), available at
http://www.cluteinstitute.com/Programs/LasVegas_2009/Article%20356.pdf (last visited Aug. 3,
2009).
3. See, e.g., Colin Barr, The Truth About Credit Default Swaps, FORTUNE/CNNMONEY.COM,
March 16, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/16/markets/cds.bear.fortune/index.htm (last visited July
19, 2009).
4. 2002 Annual Report (Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Omaha, NE), Feb. 2003, at 13-15,
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf (last visited July 19, 2009).
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derivatives are beneficial for the marketplace, but rather just need
comprehensive oversight and regulation.5
The international financial markets, particularly the CDS market, have
grown to incredible levels at a rapid rate, yet the regulatory framework has
lagged well behind the financial innovations. Because regulation has not
developed as fast as financial markets, the global economy and individual
investors are severely exposed to potential large economic losses and
abuses. The current crisis is thought to have occurred because of a
"divergence between domestic regulatory structures and the realities of
global finance."6
This Note has five main purposes. The first is to introduce the basics
of CDSs, how they came to be a dominant financial instrument, the benefit
and risks of these instruments, and their dispersion into the international
marketplace. Second, it will discuss the lack of regulation of the CDS
market prior to the global financial crisis of 2007-08. Third, it analyzes the
current recommendations from various sources as to how the CDS market
should be regulated from the current date forward and the effects of these
new regulations. The fourth part contains an examination of the eight
pending pieces of legislation in the U.S. Congress. Finally, the Note makes
recommendations on the most efficient way to regulate CDSs to ensure
financial stability and avoid future financial crises through strict oversight
of the CDS market.
II. HISTORY OF THE CDS MARKET
A credit derivative is a financial derivative product7 which isolates a
specific credit risk and then transfers this risk to a party willing to hold it;
where credit risk is the risk that a borrower of money will not repay its
obligation. The credit derivative alleviates the transferor of risk while
placing the risk onto an obligor, who will hold the risk for some specified
time for a fee from the transferor. Note that with a credit derivative, one
5. See, e.g., Rene M. Stulz, Should We Fear Derivatives?, J. OF ECON. PERSP., Vol. 18, No.
3, 170 (2004) (noting that proponents of CDSs praise their ability to spread risk and increase liquidity in
credit markets, while the critics warn that an event could trigger a derivatives tsunami that could bring
all of the major banks down and cause a burst in world credit markets).
6. Douglas W. Amer, The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes and Consequences, 43
INT'L LAW. 91, 97 (2009).
7. A financial derivative product is commonly defined as a finance instrument which derives
its value from some other referenced asset, liability, index, event, contract, condition, or other financial
instrument. The most common examples of a financial derivative product are futures, options, forwards,
and swaps.
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party's loss is the other party's gain because a credit derivative never
eliminates risk, but only transfers the credit risk and does not create wealth.
These instruments are unique because the transferor may trade the
credit risk to any obligor separately from the reference asset that creates the
credit risk. What this means is that the credit derivative detaches the risk
imbedded in an asset from the expected returns from holding the asset;
enabling the market to freely trade credit risk completely separate from
assets. Thus, the value of a credit derivative greatly depends on the value of
the underlying reference asset, and the underlying asset's value is derived
largely from market forces. 9
A CDS contract is the most popular type of credit derivative, which
focuses on transferring the risk of some specified negative credit event,
usually a default on the underlying reference asset, to another party.'0
CDSs are used to hedge or speculate against particular credit risks,
primarily default on some underlying asset." The CDS seller (protection
seller) acquires the risk of the credit event from the CDS buyer (protection
buyer) because the protection buyer pays a fee to the protection seller for
carrying the risk for some specified timeframe. 12  The debtor (reference
entity), the issuer of the underlying asset, is typically not a party to the CDS
contract, and most times is not even aware of the CDS transaction.
8. See Stulz, supra note 5, at 186-87 (discussing the fundamental characteristics of credit
derivatives and their increasing roles in the credit markets).
9. See Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 677, 706-07 (2002) (discussing how a credit derivative is capable of separating
credit risk from an asset, bond, commodity, index, debt, or other economic indicator so that the credit
risk can be transferred to another entity).
10. Andrd Scheerer, Credit Derivatives: An Overview of Regulatory Initiatives in the U.S. and
Europe, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 149, 150-51 (2000). The author notes that "reference assets"
typically include bank loans, corporate debt, trade receivables, emerging market and municipal debt, and
convertible securities, as well as the credit exposure generated from other derivatives-linked activities
like collateralized debt obligations.
11. There are three standard types of CDS contracts: (1) a single-name CDS which is based
on one underlying, reference obligation or entity; (2) a multi-name CDS which is based on more than
one underlying, reference obligation or entity; and (3) an index CDS which is based on a grouping of
typically more than 100 reference obligations or entities. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, INSURANCE, AND GOVERNMENT
SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, GAO-09-397T, SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND RECENT
INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS RISK POSED BY CREDIT DEFAULT SwAPs 4 (Mar. 2009).
12. Scheerer, supra note 10, at 150-51. The author notes the typical parties to these CDS
contracts include commercial banks, insurance companies, corporations, money managers, mutual
funds, hedge funds, and pension funds.
[Vol. 16:1
2009]
Therefore, the credit worthiness of the debtor is the main motivating force
behind the price of the CDS contract.1
3
Once a publicly verifiable negative credit event occurs, t4 the CDS
contract must be settled in one of two methods: physical or cash settlement.
During a physical settlement, the protection buyer is required to transfer the
underlying reference asset to the protection seller in exchange for the
protection seller's credit default payment, which equals the entire face (par)
value of the reference obligation.' 5 During a cash settlement, the protection
buyer keeps the underlying reference asset, but rather the protection seller's
default payment is equal to the difference between the reference
obligation's face value and some prearranged amount, typically the current
market (recovery) value of the reference obligation.16
As mentioned previously, the majority of CDS contracts are traded on
the OTC market. The OTC market consists of private parties entering into
CDS contracts directly with one another, so the contract's terms are
formulated to fit each party's needs with little standardization. 7 Thus, CDS
transactions can vary greatly being that parties directly negotiate with one
another as to the details of each contract. Because of the unlimited
variations of any one contract, CDSs are not traded through an intermediary
exchange, nor standardized or regulated by any governmental agency.
Essentially, almost every term of a CDS contract can be negotiated and
tailored to the parties' specifications, making their applicability almost
endless.
18
The CDS contract, as we know and use it today, was invented in 1997
by Blythe Masters of JP Morgan.' 9 The intent was to create a financial
13. See Feder, supra note 9, at 708-11 (discussing the underlying reference entity's typical
role in the CDS transaction).
14. See Scheerer, supra note 10, at 157. The author notes that the protection seller makes no
payment until "there is a default as defined in the CDS contract which may include, for example, a
bankruptcy, cross-acceleration, downgrade of the reference asset or its issuer, repudiation or
moratorium, restructuring or payment default." Id.
15. Noah L. Wynkoop, Note, The Unregulables? The Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds
and Credit Derivatives, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 3095, 3097-98 (2008).
16. Id. at 3098.
17. See John T. Lynch, Comment, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants Need for
Direct Regulatory Intervention - A Model for the Future of US. Regulation?, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 1371,
1375 (2008) (discussing the OTC market for CDS transactions and the essentials of the OTC derivative
market).
18. See id. at 1375-76.
19. David Teather, The Woman Who Built Financial 'Weapon of Mass Destruction',
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (U.K.), Sept. 20, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/20/wallstreet.banking (last visited July 20, 2009).
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derivative that could remove risk from companies' balance sheets, thus
separating the credit default risk on issued loans from the actual loans
themselves. 20 Thus, the CDS could remove the risk and have it moved to an
off-balance sheet vehicle, clearing the company of having default risk on its
balance sheet. Financial institutions, mainly banks, argued that by trading
CDS contracts, they had spread their credit risk elsewhere and, therefore,
needed lower monetary reserves to protect against any loan defaults.
Regulators agreed and conceded in pursuing or enforcing regulations, so
bank loans increased and the CDS market expanded rapidly.2'
The OTC financial derivatives market is currently the largest financial
market in the world, nominally valued at $591.963 trillion at the year-end
2008.22 As of year-end 2008, the outstanding notional amount of CDS
contracts worldwide is estimated at $41.868 trillion, down from its peak
value of $57.894 trillion at the year-end of 2007.23 In comparison, 2008
year-end, the worldwide stock market was valued at $32.132 trillion,24 the
worldwide bond market, including all private and sovereign issued bonds,
was valued at $83 trillion,25 and the nominal gross domestic product (GDP)
of global economy was valued at $60.115 trillion.26 Furthermore, the
notional value of the CDS market is more than seven times larger than the
$6.2 trillion in outstanding U.S. corporate debt.2 7
Although there are several benefits for CDS contracts in the
marketplace, the most common rationale for CDSs is the overall ability to
distribute credit risk throughout the global markets because parties buy and
sell the credit risks that they are willing to possess.28 Therefore, it is argued
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, MONETARY AND ECONOMIC DEPARTMENT,
OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2008 7 (May 2009), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/otchyO9O5.pdfnoframes=l (last visited July 21, 2009).
23. Id. at 10; BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, MONETARY AND ECONOMIC
DEPARTMENT, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY N THE SECOND HALF OF 2007 10 (May 2008),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc-hy0805.pdf?noframes= 1 (last visited July 21, 2009).
24. Bloomberg, World Market Cap Chart (2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/cbuilder.?tickerl=WCAUWRLD%3AIND (last visited July 20, 2009).
25. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LONDON, BOND MARKETS 2009 1 (July 2009),
available at http://www.ifsl.org.uk/output/Reportltem.aspx?NewslD=287 (last visited July 20, 2009).
26. The World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, Gross Domestic Product 2008,
July 1, 2009, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICSIResourcesIGDP.pdf (last visited
July 21, 2009).
27. See Young, McCord & Crawford, supra note 2, at 1.
28. See Scheerer, supra note 10, at 150-51. The author notes several rationales for why a
party may be interested in buying or selling a CDS contracL The protection buyer may want to reduce
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that CDSs act as shock absorbers because credit risks are spread amongst
many institutions around the world, limiting the concentration of losses.29
Another benefit, or so it is argued, is that the CDS market increases
liquidity and access to capital because CDSs permit banks to transfer risk,
increasing a bank's ability to lend more money into the economy.30 Other
typical advantages are the CDSs capacity to increase investors' ability to
achieve higher payoffs in excess to other forms of investments of the same
amount because the CDS purchaser does not need to own the underlying
reference asset. Further, CDS contracts may be combined to create an
extensive array of risk portfolios depending on the investor's risk appetite.
31
One can think of a CDS contract as acting similar to insurance for
credit default events; one party buys insurance-the CDS contract-
through a premium payment, against an unknown negative credit event in
the future.32 If the unknown credit event occurs, the seller of the
insurance-the CDS contract-is obligated to pay compensation to the
buyer according to the contract's terms. But if the credit event fails to
occur, the seller keeps the premium payment and the contract expires.
However, the CDS market is not regulated like the insurance industry,
although CDSs appear to have similar characteristics as insurance
contracts.33
The three principal differences, although there are certainly more,
34
between a CDS contract and an insurance contract are, first, the protection
buyer under a CDS need not own the underlying reference asset, or
otherwise have any insurable interest in that asset. Second, the protection
buyer under a CDS need not have to suffer any loss in order to recover on
exposure to risk while maintaining relationships that may be endangered by selling its loans, reduce or
diversify illiquid exposures, or reduce exposure while avoiding adverse tax or accounting treatment.
The protection seller may want to diversify credit exposures, get access to credit markets which are
otherwise restricted by internal policy or off-limits by regulation, or arbitrage pricing discrepancies
resulting from mispricing in between markets.
29. Wynkoop, supra note 15, at 3096-99.
30. Id. at 3099.
31. Id.
32. See Merrill Lynch Intern. v. XL Capital Assur. Inc., 564 F.Supp.2d 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
33. See generally Andrea S. Kramer, Alton B. Harris, & Robert A. Ansehl, The New York
State Insurance Department and Credit Default Swaps: Good Intentions, Bad Idea, J. TAx'N & REG.
FIN. INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jan./Feb. 2009).
34. For an in-depth analysis of all the differences between a CDS and insurance contract, See
generally Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps,
Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167 (2007).
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the CDS contract.35 Third, the protection buyer or seller under a CDS could
transfer the CDS contract to another party through assignment or novation,
where an insurance contract is considered a personal contract and
nontransferable.36 As stated by the United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, "CDS agreements are thus significantly different from insurance
contracts... [CDS contracts] 'do not, and are not meant to, indemnify the
buyer of protection against loss. Rather, CDS contracts allow parties to
'hedge' risk by buying and selling risks at different prices and with varying
degrees of correlation. ,,
37
While a CDS transaction transpires exclusively between financial
institutions and other sophisticated parties, insurance is for individual
consumers like you and me.38 Because CDS contracts are not regulated
under insurance laws, the parties engaged in the CDS market do not need to
meet any capital requirements, such as those required of insurance
providers.39 Further, in addition to the aforementioned differences between
the CDS market and insurance industry, there are other differences in tax,
accounting, bankruptcy, and in regulatory jurisdiction. 40
The major users of CDS contracts consist of banks, pension funds,
mutual funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, and private investment
funds. These institutions fall under three major groups of users: hedgers,
speculators, and arbitrageurs. 41 Due to globalization, the array of financial
institutions involved with CDS transactions are not confined to national
borders. The recent financial crisis of 2007-08 exemplifies this
interconnectivity of financial institutions throughout the world, especially
because this is the world's first true global financial crisis. 42
35. Mark Garbowski, Credit Default Swaps: A Brief Insurance Primer (Anderson Kill &
Olick P.C., New York, NY), Jan. 2009.
36. See Schwartz, supra note 34, at 191-92.
37. Aon Financial Products, Inc. v. Socit G(n3rale, 476 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing to
Br. ofamicus curiae Int'l Swaps and Derivatives Ass'n, Inc. (ISDA), at 7).
38. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 201.
39, Garbowski, supra note 35.
40. Id.; See also Arthur D. Postal, Credit Default Swap Belong Under Supervision of States,
NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, PROPERTY & CASUALTY 7, 33 (Feb. 23, 2009); Chris McMahon & Daniel P.
Collins, CDS Regulation Battle, FUTURES I (Dec. 1, 2008). The aforementioned articles discuss why
CDS contracts have not been subject to state insurance regulations and explain the current debate as to
which federal agency has jurisdiction over the CDS market, either the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or Federal Reserve Bank (FRB).
41. See Feder, supra note 9, at 717.
42. Mark Landler, I.MF. Puts Bank Losses from Global Financial Crisis at $4.1 Trillion,
N.Y. TImEs, April 22, 2009, at A6. This article estimates that banks and other financial institutions face
aggregate losses of $4.05 trillion in the value of their holdings as a result of the current financial crisis,
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Although CDSs are certainly not the sole cause of the financial crisis,
they assisted in creating the conditions for a financial meltdown and may
exacerbate the crisis into the future.43 CDSs gained popularity with the
growth of securitization of loans and other debt instruments. 44  The
securitized debt is often pooled together into a mortgaged backed security
(MBS), which pulls together and balances underlying loans of various
credit qualities, thus separating the risks from the debt instruments.45 So,
securitization permits credit risk to be spread amongst a wide group of
investors and reduces the risk exposure by the financial institution holding
the assets or debt itself.46 However, the fundamental problem is that these
MBSs are complex instruments with most investors not understanding the
risk imbedded within them, plus the international market is entirely
unregulated. Therefore, banks were able to transfer the credit risk of their
debt and assets throughout the global economy, which encouraged banks to
increase loans, overextend credit, and acquire enormous risks, which slowly
spread to different institutions worldwide by use of the MBSs and CDSs.47
CDSs boomed as a way to balance all the credit risks formed by the
newly created securitized assets, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and
MBSs, by hedging or providing default protection in case the underlying
obligation failed.48 Essentially, the CDS contract was viewed as a form of
"insurance" against default of the underlying asset or debt instruments.
49
For example, a CDS contract will be purchased to offset the credit risk of
mortgage defaults within the MBS; so the CDS is a security net against
negative credit cycles and defaults.50  Thus, a bank in California can issue
MBSs to a pension fund in the European Union, who in turn purchases CDS
with $2.07 trillion of the losses held by United States institutions. This monetary loss, mainly carried by
U.S., Western European, and Japanese institutions, has caused crises in emerging market economies,
principally Eastern Europe and Latin America.
43. Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of US.
Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 77, 79-82 (2008).
44. Id. at 80-81. Banks in the United States were operating an "originate-to-distribute" loan
model, making residential mortgages to many borrowers for the purpose of selling these mortgages to
investors by using securitization techniques. The incentives of banks were to make as many loans as
possible and then distribute the risk of these loans to investors while not having to retain a sufficient
portion of the credit risk themselves. Hence, the boom in sub-prime mortgages that were securitized and
sold throughout the world, and the eventual default on many of these loans.
45. Id. at 82-83.
46. Id. at 80.
47. See id. at 80-82.
48. Unterman 2008, supra note 43, at 89-90.
49. See Young, McCord & Crawford, supra note 2, at 3.
50. Id. at 90.
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contracts from an insurance company in Japan, who in turn buys CDS
contracts from an investment bank in New York, and so on. The most
recent purchase of a CDS is systemically linked to the original issuance of
the MBS, demonstrating the intricately linked CDS market as well as
international financial markets. These transactions are not regulated by an
international agency, and are minimally, if at all, regulated by national
governments. This process of hedging aids the exposed entities in
protecting themselves from a loss in the case that a negative credit event
occurs which affects the reference obligation.5
Outside of using CDSs as a way to hedge against credit risks, they are
used to speculate on the default of a reference entity or asset, and also to
execute arbitrage strategies. Speculators are entities that buy and sell CDSs
without owning the underlying reference asset, and thus lack having a true
exposure to the risks of the underlying asset, because the speculator
believes the market will move in a certain direction or certain credit events
will occur. Essentially, speculators place bets on beliefs of how the
financial markets will move in the future and the market's results on the
underlying reference asset, entity, or obligation, but never buy or hold the
reference asset, entity, or obligation.5 2 Arbitragers will buy a CDS contract
in one market and simultaneously sell the same CDS in another market,
accordingly to exploit a difference in the prices for the CDS contract in
different markets due to pricing inefficiencies.53 Because speculators and
arbitragers do not own the underlying reference asset, these CDS market
participants trade CDSs in the short-term, bringing liquidity and more
accurate risk pricing to the OTC derivative marketplace.
54
An example of a CDS transaction follows. Pension Fund P owns a
bond from Corporation C. Pension Fund P is concerned that Corporation C
may have financial problems and default on the bond; so Pension Fund P
purchases a CDS from Bank B. The CDS contract asserts that if
Corporation C defaults on the bond, Bank B will guarantee the full face
value of the bond. Now to protect itself from the bond default risk, Bank B
purchases a CDS from Investment Bank I with Corporation C's bond as the
underlying reference asset, although Bank B does not own a Corporation C
bond. What is more, Hedge Fund H, which has no connection to any of
these entities, believes that Corporation C and Investment Bank I are not
financially healthy. Hedge Fund H decides to bet against these two entities
by using CDSs. Hedge Fund H obtains two CDSs from Reinsurance
51, See Feder, supra note 9, at 717.
52. See id. at 719-20.
53. See id. at 720-21.
54. Id. at 717-21.
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Company R, one CDS for Corporation C's bond and one CDS for a security
issued by Investment Bank I.
Hedge Fund H wants both Corporation C and Investment Bank I to
move into insolvency so it can collect on its two CDS contracts. As
Corporation C and Investment Bank I begin to show signs of insolvency,
Hedge Fund H will start selling CDS contracts on these two entities, C and
I, because as an entity grows closer to bankruptcy, the price of a CDS
contract on that entity increases, being the cost of a credit event increases in
regards to the protection seller. Thus, Hedge Fund H can sell two identical
CDSs that it currently owns to earn a profit because the two CDSs it owns
cost less to hold than the two CDSs it sold. This means the four total CDSs
that Hedge Fund H is currently a party of will hedge one another, making
Hedge Fund H almost completely safe from the credit risks of the entities,
yet it profits from price differentials for identical CDS contracts on the
same entities and assets, but Hedge Fund H has no connection with any of
the aforementioned entities.
The greatest problem arises when one entity becomes a party to
enough CDS contracts that a failure to be able to satisfy all its obligations
would create a chain reaction to all other entities involved. This would
send a shock wave into the entire global economic system; and because
CDS contracts are traded on the OTC market, financial markets do not
know which entities own which CDSs, the risks these entities currently
hold, and the monetary amount of each CDS transaction.55
III. RISKS INHERENT WITHIN THE CDS MARKETPLACE
The CDS market is designed to reduce an entity's exposure to credit
risks by permitting the risk holding entity to unbundle this credit risk from
the asset or debt, then sell the risk to a party willing to possess it. Although
the CDS transfers the credit default risk to another party, the CDS contract
inherently generates several risks of its own.56 These customary CDS risks
include market, credit including counterparty and settlement risks, liquidity,
operational, legal, systemic, moral hazard, concentration, and default.
However, intrinsic risks in a CDS transaction will vary on a case-by-case
basis due to the large variation in types of transactions,57 especially
international CDSs. Prior to discussing current and potential regulations in
55. Alex Blumberg, Unregulated Credit Default Swaps Led to Weakness, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO, Oct. 31, 2008, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=96395271
(last visited July 21, 2009).
56. See Feder, supra note 9, at 721-31.
57. See Scheerer, supra note 10, at 162-75.
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the CDS marketplace, it is crucial to understand the inherent risks of this
OTC derivative.
A. Market Risk
Market risk is common to all financial derivatives because any party to
a CDS contract faces the possibility that the face value of the contract will
change with changes in the conditions of the general marketplace.58 For
example, a party selling a CDS contract, the protection seller, encounters
the risk that some action in the marketplace will have a negative effect on
the underlying reference entity, thus devaluing the reference asset and
increasing the likelihood that the protection seller will have to settle the
contract. 59
B. Counterparty and Settlement Risks
Every party to a financial derivative confronts the risk that the
counterparty will fail to meet the terms of the contract. This CDS credit
risk can be split into counterparty and settlement risks. Counterparty risk
arises because the counterparty to the CDS contract may become insolvent
sometime prior to the settlement date stated in the contract. The failures of
the counterparty to remain solvent does not necessarily suggest the
blameless party will lose an amount equal to the face value of the reference
asset. Rather, the blameless party's loss is equal to the cost it suffers to
replace the original CDS with the same CDS from another party for the
remaining timeframe.6 ° Counterparty risk grows ever more complicated
once the CDS is issued into the market because the seller or the buyer may
choose to trade the contract to other parties. Thus, a CDS may have several
different counterparties over its lifetime, making the task of tracking and
assessing counterparty risk highly intricate and potentially inaccurate.6'
There are two valuable tactics for minimizing counterparty risks.
First, netting 62 permits the parties to terminate outstanding transactions
between each other when one counterparty becomes insolvent, rectifying
the parties' payables and receivables. However, the contractual terms for
58. See Feder, supra note 9, at 722.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 723.
61. Rosa Abrantes-Metz & Cathy M. Niden, The Information Content of Credit Default Swap
Prices, 14 No. 18 ANDREWS DERIVATIVES LIrTo. REP. 1, 2 (2008).
62. Netting is the process by which an entity may cancel out a positive value and a negative
value, in part or in whole, in order to decrease the amount of exposure the entity has in the market.
There are three major types of netting: settlement, novation, and close-out.
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the netting arrangement must be legally enforceable, allowing parties to
exchange counterparty risk for legal risks. Either way, netting is highly
beneficial because it condenses several payments into one while
simultaneously reducing the parties' outstanding capital charges.63 Second,
credit support provides collateral, such as a reserve of money paid by the
parties, as a guarantee in case of the counterparty's failure. While credit
support does not eradicate the counterparty risk, it provides a minimal
safety net that the parties know exists to protect a certain value of the CDS
transaction in the case of default.64
Settlement risk is the risk that one of the parties will meet the CDS
contractual requirements on the settlement date, while the other party will
not. Settlement risk can endanger the liquidity of the compliant party
because the complaint party may need the CDS payment in a timely manner
in order to pay other obligations. This will arise in the international CDS
market because the parties may reside in different time zones, delaying the
transferring of funds between bank accounts.65 Similar to the counterparty
risk, settlement risk may be reduced by the use of netting all the payables
and receivables of the parties on the given settlement date; therefore
reducing the total amount one party will owe to the other.
66
C. Liquidity Risk
Another inescapable risk is when a party will not be able to transact in
the CDS market without experiencing extraordinary costs due to a lack of
immediately available resources or other parties to transact. This liquidity
risk can be divided into two subtypes: funding liquidity and market
liquidity risks. Funding liquidity risk emerges when a party cannot meet its
payment obligations under the CDS due to a temporary cash shortage.
Market liquidity risk arises when a party is unable to terminate the CDS
transaction prior to the maturity date. Market liquidity risks primarily occur
because the CDS contract is not assignable or disallows novation.67
D. Operational Risk
Operational risk is the possibility that parties holding a CDS contract
will improperly measure, monitor, or control the risks that the CDS
contract, as well as financial markets in general, manifests and creates. So
63. Feder, supra note 9, at 723-24.
64. Id. at 724.
65. Id. at 724-25.
66. Id. at 725.
67. Id. at 725-26.
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to minimize operational risks, the parties must calculate their exposure,
ability, and desire to carry the risk.68 To ensure that entities engaged in
CDS transactions regularly and properly address their operational risks,
mandatory standards and oversight will guarantee compliance, thus
minimizing these operational risks.
E. Legal Risk
Because CDSs are new to the financial industry and lack both national
and international regulation, the CDS market runs the risk that new laws
and legislation will not be enforced properly or efficiently. Also, parties
risk that the contracts will be voided or not honored. This risk is evident in
the current financial market climate. With a rise in financial litigation and
pressing concerns for new regulations, the future of the CDS market is not
quite certain. The last decade illustrates what happens when the legal
system fails to expand and innovate at the same rate as the financial
markets. The legal risks arise from the CDS contract and the counterparty,
with risks and costs intensifying when dealing internationally because of
differences in legal regimes.69
F. Foreign-Exchange Risk
International CDS contracts contain a risk not inherent in domestic
CDS transaction, foreign-exchange risk. Foreign-exchange risk is the risk
of an investment's value changing due to changes in currency exchange
rates, or the risk that an investor will have to close out a position
in a foreign currency at a loss due to an adverse movement in exchange
rates.70 For example, if money must be converted to another currency so
the protection buyer can make the premium payments or so the protection
seller can make the settlement payments, the parties risk any changes in the
currency exchange rate that could cause an increase to either of their
payments or a decrease in the value of the CDS contract.7'
68. Feder, supra note 9, at 727.
69. Id. at 728.
70. Investopedia, Foreign-Exchange Risk,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/foreignexchangerisk.asp (last visited July 24, 2009).
71. See generally The Recent Turmoil in the Icelandic Foreign Exchange Swap Market,
Monetary Bulletin 2008-1 (Central Bank of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland), Apr. 2008, available at
http://www.sedlabanki.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=6096 (last visited July 21, 2009).
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G. Systemic Risk
Since the recent financial crisis, systemic risk has been receiving a lot
of coverage and discussion. Systemic risk is the risk that some trigger
event will create a negative chain reaction throughout the entire financial or
economic system. Essentially, some economic shock, such as an
institutional failure, will disperse into the economy, causing a domino effect
of negative events with widespread consequences.72 Regarding the CDS
market, two opposing sides have emerged as to whether CDSs increase
systemic risk. Critics argue that CDS transactions transfer underlying risks
while simultaneously creating new risks. Therefore, the CDSs create an
intricate network of transactions and risks because the CDS market is not
transparent and illiquid, with the parties to the CDS transactions passing
and undertaking risks that they do not fully understand and underestimate.
In the worst case scenario, the failure of one entity to meet its obligations
will begin a chain reaction causing an eventual collapse of the entire
financial system.
73
On the other side, the proponents argue that CDSs pose no more of a
threat than any other financial instrument. CDSs assist in transferring risk
from one entity into a market among several parties who are better able and
willing to carry these risks. Thus, CDSs stabilize the economy by
permitting one entity with a lot of risk to disburse this risk in the market
among a group of other entities, decreasing the systemic risk if one entity
should fail.74
The recent financial crisis provides us with great examples of systemic
risk. For example in 2008, American International Group (AIG), the
world's largest private insurance company, required a financial $152 billion
bailout by the United States federal government and to eventually be seized
by the government itself, now owning an eighty percent stake in the
company. 75 AIG became a large protection seller of CDSs to many
institutions, mainly financial firms wanting to protect themselves from risks
inherent in MBSs, boosting profits for AIG to record levels. So while all
the premium payments from the CDS protection buyers went into AIG as
72. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193, 198 (2008).
73. Feder, supra note 9, at 729.
74. Id. at 729-31.
75. Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASHINGTON POST,
Dec. 31, 2008, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/contentlarticle/2008/12/30/AR2008123003431.html (last visited July 22, 2009). See also Edmund
L. Andrews, Fed Rescues AIG with $85 Billion Loan for 80% Stake, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 17,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/business/worldbusiness/ 7iht- 7insure. 16217125.htmil (last
visited Aug. 2, 2009).
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profit, all these outstanding CDS contracts opened AIG to billions of dollars
of potential losses and payouts, upon a credit event occurrence.76 When the
housing market began to unravel in 2007 and Lehman Brothers failed in
2008, it set off a chain of events that would prove disastrous for AIG; credit
rating agencies downgraded their ratings of securities that AIG had insured
with the CDSs. The credit rating downgrades increased demands by AIG's
CDS counterparties for billions of dollars in collateral. Thus, AIG began a
desperate search for cash to meet the collateral calls under the CDSs. 7 7 As
downgrades continued, AIG continually needed to post more collateral for
the $450 billion it wrote in CDS contracts.78 Eventually, the federal
government had to step in to save AIG from financially collapsing.79
United States Treasury Secretary, Henry M. Paulson, concluded that
AIG would not be allowed to collapse because the company was too big.8°
Eric Dinallo, the Superintendent of Insurance for the State of New York,
recognized that because AIG had operated for so long at the center of the
world's financial web, with so many CDS counterparties, that its collapse
would be felt in every comer of the globe.8' The federal government
decided that if it did not provide AIG with funds to pay for the CDS
contracts, AIG's default would cause other entities expecting payments to
not be able to make payments on their obligations and so on; true systemic
risk in practice.82
H. Moral Hazard Risk
Another inherent risk imbedded within a CDS transaction is the
parties' incentives to neglect the risk of the underlying reference asset,
obligation, or entity. This moral hazard suggests that a CDS will reduce an
incentive to monitor or accurately appraise certain risks.83 For example, a
bank that makes loans and then purchases a CDS to reduce the risk of a
borrower default will have a reduced incentive to monitor the loans. A
bank is in the best position to screen the borrower of money and monitor
the borrower's finances, but when the bank transfers the loan default risk to
76. O'Harrow Jr. & Dennis, supra note 75, at A01.
77. See Young, McCord & Crawford, supra note 2, at 4.
78. See id.
79. O'Harrow Jr. & Dennis, supra note 75, at A01.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U.
CN. L. REv. 1019, 1032-33 (2007).
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a third party, the bank loses this incentive to monitor the issued loans. If
the third party taking on the risk does not monitor the reference obligation,
CDS purchasers have an incentive to make ever more risky investments.
84
L Concentration and Default Risks
Concentration risk is the potential for a loss when a party, usually a
large financial institution, establishes a large net exposure to CDS
contracts.8 5 When an entity sells a large amount of CDS contracts without
purchasing and holding offsetting positions, concentration risk greatly
increases. This risk is evermore amplified by the fact that there is no legal
requirement that the buyer and seller of CDS contracts post margin and
collateral funds to ensure that either party will be able to meet obligations
stipulated in the CDS. Further, a party holding a large concentrated
position in CDS contracts may face financial difficulty if the condition of
the financial market changes in any direction, good or bad, because certain
provisions in the CDS may require increased margin or collateral posts,
placing the party in financial distress with increasing liquidity problems. 6
Jump-to-default risk is the risk that the onset of a credit event for the
underlying reference asset, as defined in the CDS contract, will create an
abrupt change in the party's CDS exposure or financial condition.8 7 As
mentioned previously, a change in the financial market will alter the value
of the CDS contracts, which in turn may demand that a party post additional
margin or collateral amounts. Thus, if the values of the CDSs alter so
drastically as to force a party to post additional funds beyond what the party
is financially capable of posting, a default on the CDS contracts will likely
occur.
8 8
IV. CURRENT UNITED STATES REGULATION OF THE CDS MARKET
The United States holds a substantial role in the global financial
market. The U.S. regulation of financial markets is important because
financial decisions will be based on the legal and regulatory requirements
inside and outside the nation's borders. Further, the United States is known
to be the largest recipient of foreign investment because it is regarded as
stable, profitable, and a vigilant guardian of investor rights. It has created a
84. See id. at 1033-34.
85. See TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMI-rEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, INSURANCE, AND
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, GAO-09-397T, supra note 11, at 14.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 15.
88. See id.
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balanced standard for liberalization and regulation, thus the United States is
the leader of the financial markets and the world looks to the United States
89for guidance as to regulatory initiatives.
The current state of CDS market regulation in the United States is
quite limited. The SEC chairman, Christopher Cox, stated "[t]he regulatory
black hole for credit-default swaps is one of the most significant issues we
are confronting in the current credit crisis, and it requires immediate
legislative action." 90  Furthermore, he declared "[t]he over-the-counter
credit-default swaps market has drawn the world's major financial
institutions and others into a tangled web of interconnections where the
failure of any one institution might jeopardize the entire financial system.
This is an unacceptable situation for a free-market economy." 91
The Securities Act of 1933 (Act of 1933) regulates domestic securities
transactions in order to protect investors and bolster market efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.92 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Act of 1934) requires, inter alia, the registration of security brokers and
dealers with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).93 Further, the
securities that the brokers and dealers sell must be traded on a national
exchange.94 These two federal statutes have the potential to regulate CDS
contracts, however, the definition of a "security" does not include a CDS,95
and thus a CDS escapes regulation by the SEC under these federal
securities statutes.96
89. See Unterman 2008, supra note 43, at 104.
90. O'Harrow Jr. & Dennis, supra note 75, at AOl.
91. Id.
92. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(b) (West 2009).
93. Id. §§ 78o, 78d.
94. Id. § 781(a).
95. Id. §§ 77b-1, 78c-1.
96. Cf The Investment Company Act of 1940 (IC Act of 1940) codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-
1 through 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-64. The IC Act of 1940 was designed to mitigate or eliminate conflicts of
interest of investment companies and securities exchanges which adversely affect the interests of the
public and investors. The IC Act of 1940 regulates CDSs if an investment company makes use of a
CDS contract because bank regulators have authority to intervene in an investment company's actions to
the extent the CDS transactions of the entity affects its financial health. However, the IC Act of 1940
includes exempt companies, like hedge funds, within Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) and the regulators'
authority to intervene is limited to CDS activity deemed to pose risks to the safety and soundness of the
entities regulated. Therefore, the IC Act of 1940 may or may not regulate CDS transactions depending
on what type of company is entering into the contract and the risks involved. Although it may regulate
certain CDSs, the CDSs used by banking institutions, the Act does not regulate the CDS market as a
whole. See TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, INSURANCE, AND
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, GAO-09-397T, supra note 11, at 6-7.
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The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) generally regulates financial
derivatives.97 Nevertheless, a CDS contract avoids regulation under this
federal statute for at least one of two definitions. First, a CDS is excluded
because the CEA excludes a commodity that is a credit risk or measure,
debt instrument, other measure of economic or commercial risk, or an
occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency that is beyond the
control of the parties to the relevant contract, agreement, or transaction; and
associated with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence.98
Second, a CDS is excluded because the CEA does not apply to any
agreement, contract, or transaction that is entered into only between persons
that are eligible contract participants at the time they enter into the
agreement, contract, or transaction; subject to individual negotiation by the
parties; and not executed or traded on a trading facility.99 Eligible parties to
a CDS contract must be well capitalized, sophisticated entities like financial
institutions, insurance and investment companies, and corporations. 00
In 2000, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
(CFMA) to amend the CEA. 10' Identical to the CEA, the CFMA interpreted
a CDS to not be a type of security; thus not regulated by federal securities
laws.10 2 The CFMA defines a "swap agreement" as:
[Any agreement, contract, or transaction between eligible
contract participants . . . that provides for any purchase, sale,
payment or delivery... that is dependent on the occurrence, non-
occurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or
contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or
commercial consequence; [or] provides on an executory basis for
the exchange ... of one or more payments based on the value or
level of one or more interest or other rates, currencies,
commodities, securities, instruments of indebtedness, indices,
quantitative measures, or other financial or economic interests or
property of any kind . .. in whole or in part, the financial risk
associated with a future change in any such value or level without
also conveying a current or future direct or indirect ownership
97. 7 U.S.C.A. § la(4) (West 2009).
98. Id. § la(13).
99. Id. § 2(g).
100. Id. § la(12).
101. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. (2000).
102. See id.
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interest in an asset ... or liability that incorporates the financial
risk so transferred .... 103
It appears clear that this definition of a "swap agreement" includes a
CDS contract, but to ensure that there is no confusion, Congress explicitly
classified a CDS as a "swap agreement" by stating, "any such agreement,
contract, or transaction commonly known as a... debt swap, credit spread,
credit default swap, credit swap. . .. ",4
There is one exception to the lack of regulation by the federal
government. The SEC will be able to quasi-regulate a CDS because a CDS
is a "security-based swap agreement," meaning the swap derives at least
one of its key terms from the price, yield, maturity, or volatility of a
security, group of securities, or index of securities. 105 Therefore, under the
Act of 1933 and the Act of 1934, the SEC can enforce anti-fraud, anti-
manipulation, and insider trading provisions against traders of a "security-
based swap agreement."'
0 6
Congress intended to create regulations that would promote innovation
in the OTC derivative market, rather than have CDSs repressed because the
parties to CDS transactions are sophisticated. 0 7 Consequently, the CFMA
officially unregulated the CDS market under the rationale that the CDS
market would self-regulate.'0 8 Since the recent financial crisis, former
proponents of an unregulated CDS market have recognized the failure in
this approach. 109
V. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF THE CDS MARKET
Currently, there is no international regulatory agency that directly
monitors or regulates the CDS market °10 Therefore, it is commonly argued
103. Id. § 301.
104. Id.
105. Id. Section 301 of the CFMA added sections 206A-C to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999. See also 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b-1, 77q, 78c-1, 78i, 78j.
106. See SEC Issues Temporary Exemption for CDS Central Counterparties (Sutherland,
Atlanta, GA), Jan. 16, 2009, at 1. See also 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b-1, 77q, 78c-1, 78i, 78j.
107. Lynch, supra note 17, at 1378.
108. Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It Is Time to Regulate Over-the-Counter
Derivatives, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 123, 128 (2009).
109. See id. (noting that former Chairman of the Federal Reserve of the United States, Alan
Greenspan, was once a strong supporter of permitting the financial derivatives market to self-regulate,
but as of recent he has changed his opinion on derivative regulation, supporting strict regulatory
oversight).
110. See generally Amer, supra note 6, at 119-34.
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that the true regulators of the CDS market are the participants
themselves."' The CDS market participants have banded together to form
a trade organization known as the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA).1 2  The ISDA has created a system of documenting,
amending, and standardizing CDS transactions in a way that is flexible and
robust for all market participants." 3
The ISDA currently has a membership of approximately 830
institutions from over fifty-eight countries." t4 The association was created
in 1985 in order to create and promote standardized documentation for
financial derivative products at a time when derivative transactions carried
high transaction costs.'1 5 It created bilateral Master Agreements for CDS
transactions in order to facilitate the market through preventative measures,
reduce costs, set international standards, and create a base structure for any
OTC derivative transaction.1 6  These Master Agreements foster
standardized terms to regulate the general obligations of the parties, events
of default, netting, early termination, transfers and novations, currency
provisions, and key definitions."' Standardized terms are useful and
important by reducing legal risk by providing clear and concise
terminology, thus reducing the risk of incompatibility of laws between
different jurisdictions." 8  Also, standardized terms increase transparency
and minimize confusion. Further, the ISDA has created a Master
Agreement specifically for international transactions, used to document
transactions between parties in different jurisdictions or transactions
involving different currencies.19
111. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 171.
112. Id. Most members of the ISDA are individual or groups of banks.
113. Id. While the ISDA is not the only organization formed by CDS market participants, it is
currently the largest and most influential in the market.
114. ISDA, Membership, http://www.isda.org/ (follow the "Membership" tab on the left hand
side of the website) (last visited July 30, 2009).
115. ISDA, About ISDA, http://www.isda.org/ (follow the "About ISDA" tab on the left hand
side of the website) (last visited July 30, 2009).
116. ISDA, Bookstore/Publications, http://www.isda.org/ (follow the "Bookstore/Publications"
tab on the left hand side of the website) (last visited July 30, 2009). The most recent Master Agreement
was published in 2002. See also Clarence B. Manning, A Derivative Primer for Corporate Counsel, or
Do You Know What Your Treasurer is Doing?, 13 No. 2 ACCA DOCKET 6, 16 (Mar./Apr. 1995).
117. See Schwartz, supra note 34, at 178 (citing to ISDA, 2002 Master Agreement (2002)). For
more information and explanation regarding the Master Agreement's standardized terms, see Feder,
supra note 9, at 736-47.
118. Scheerer, supra note 10, at 174.
119. ISDA, Bookstore/Publications, http://www.isda.org/ (follow the "Bookstore/Publications"
tab on the left hand side of the website) (last visited July 31, 2009).
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These Master Agreements may be altered to the parties' specifications
by the parties using an amending document called the Schedule. 120 The
Master Agreement and Schedule are given effect through "confirmations,"
which are documents that serve as evidence of the CDS transactions. 121 The
typical "confirmation" for a CDS transaction confirms the CDS contract's
material terms, inter alia, such as the reference entity, reference obligation
or asset, payment structures, the credit event, settlement terms, collateral
deposits, and the timeframe of the contract.
122
One important provision in the Master Agreement involves "close-out
netting," which applies when one party to the CDS defaults or becomes
insolvent. This "close-out netting" provision permits the non-defaulting to
"calculate a single settlement amount by offsetting its scheduled future
payment and delivery obligations to the bankrupt party against the bankrupt
party's obligations to it.' ' 123 Close-out netting halts a trustee or liquidator in
bankruptcy to abandon CDS contracts that are harmful to the bankrupt party
while insisting on performance of beneficial CDSs.
12 4
The Master Agreement is beneficial for CDSs in order to promote
standardized documentation of the transactions. This becomes especially
important when an insolvent party holds many CDSs with multiple
counterparties. Rather than have to appraise each CDS separately, the
Master Agreement authorizes all CDSs executed with each party to be
evaluated as a net amount. 25 Also, ISDA publishes protocols, which are
written contract amendments that empower the Master Agreements to
120. See Schwartz, supra note 34, at 178 (citing to ISDA, Schedule to the 2002 Master
Agreement (2002)). See generally 2002 Master Agreement Protocol (ISDA, New York, NY), July 15,
2003, available at http://www.isda.org/2002masterprot/masterprot-txt form adhrnce-letr.html (last
visited July 30, 2009). The ISDA counterparties can select terms from an extensive menu to meet each
party's customized situation.
121. See Schwartz, supra note 34, at 178 (citing to ISDA, 2003 Credit Derivative Definitions 1,
Exhibit A at 61 (2003)).
122. See id. at 178-79 (citing to ISDA, 2003 Credit Derivative Definitions I, Exhibit A at 61-
70(2003)).
123. See id. at 179 (citing to ISDA, 2002 Master Agreement (2002)).
124. Id. at 179. Although the close-out netting provision stops a bankrupt entity from
abandoning CDS contracts, this does not guarantee that the bankrupt entity will have the funds available
to pay all the CDSs outstanding. There are other creditors that have valid claims to the bankrupt entity's
assets so the counterparty to the CDS may not receive the total settlement amount as stated in the CDS.
See, e.g., Shannon D. Harrington & Neil Unmack, Lehman Credit-Swap Auction Sets Payout of 91.38
Cents (Update2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 10, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a_zNllDoOQM&refer=news (last visited
July 30, 2009).
125. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 180.
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respond, in a unified way, to market disturbances by giving parties equal
footing in dealing with insolvent reference entities.
126
However, because CDS transactions are privately negotiated contracts
on the OTC market, the terms of each CDS will vary depending on the
parties; there is no mandatory requirement in a CDS contract, rather the
Master Agreement is an ideal contract that the parties may choose to use.
Parties often disagree as to which terms in the CDS should be standardized
because each CDS party operates under different internal standards and
national legal regimes.127  Thus, the Master Agreement will likely be
heavily altered, giving rise to other concerns and decreasing the value of
standardized terms and definitions. Even when parties use a Master
Agreement to complete a CDS transaction, the standardized terms are
complex and may still give rise to ambiguity or conflict128 But although
the full effect of standardized terms is unknown, the 2003 Credit
Definitions published by the ISDA are thought to be reducing CDS contract
disputes.
129
Furthermore, although the ISDA has introduced and promoted the
aforementioned provisions, the ISDA does not hold regulatory authority or
power over CDS participants; signifying that compliance with ISDA
standards is optional.1 30 Critics of the ISDA state that the association resists
disclosure of CDS documentation: "[r]ecord keeping, documentation and
other practices have been so sloppy that no firm could be sure how much
risk it was taking or with whom it had a deal.'' So while the
documentation of CDSs have become ever more standardized and
synchronized, the market still manages to remain opaque because many
transactions go undisclosed to the marketplace.
13 2
The ISDA's monopolistic power over the self-regulation of the CDS
market has led many to believe that the industry promotes the interests of a
few major participants because leadership within the ISDA is dominated by
a small amount of major participants. 133 Major participants try to protect
126. Id.
127. See Feder, supra note 9, at 741.
128. See, e.g., Aon Financial Products, Inc. v. Soci6t6 Ginirale, 476 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007);
Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 375 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2004).
129. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 173.
130. See Lily Tijoe, Note, Credit Derivatives: Regulatory Challenges in an Exploding
Industry, 26 ANN. REV. BANKING & FiN. L. 387,398 (2007).
131. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 83, at 1036 (citing David Wessel, Wall Street is Cleaning
Derivatives Mess, WALL STREET JOuRNAL, Feb. 16,2006, at A2).
132. See id.
133. Id. at 1037-38.
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their interest by sacrificing the market's efficiency as a whole. 34 Protecting
self-interests should come as no surprise, being that is how rational
participants act in the market and which may be the inherent flaw with the
ISDA's self-regulation strategy. These interests are protected by
developing standardized documents, terms, and definitions that exploit
information asymmetries, create negative externalities, or redistribute
resources. Further, major participants lack an incentive to disclose
transactions or other information because broad disclosure would reduce the
major participants' specialized knowledge of the CDS market, thus
reducing potential profits.'
35
Regulation of CDSs is based on "governance arrangements for OTC
derivatives (that) are predominantly based on private sector-inspired
practices of self-regulation and self-supervision.' 36  Thus, the ISDA has
gained significant, if not complete, control of the legal rules applicable to a
CDS contract, although the ISDA's rules are not mandatory and potentially
prejudicial within the CDS marketplace.
Outside of the ISDA's self-regulatory system, there is an international
accord which created recommendations for national implementation of
banking laws and regulations, the International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards-A Revised Framework (Basel II). 1, 7
The Basel II developed a framework to foster stability within the
international banking system by regulating risk management practices of
financial institutions. The most significant measurement required by banks
under the Basel II is the "first pillar" capital equivalent. What this means is
that a bank must fulfill a total capital ratio no lower than eight percent of
the risk-weighted assets. 3 8 The risk-weighted assets standard is the bank's
assets weighted according to the credit risk of the assets; which can be
134. Id. at 1037.
135. See id.
136. Paul Latimer, Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives in Australia, 23 AUSTRL. J. OF
COMP. LAW, 12 (2009) (quoting Eleni Tsingou, The Governance of OTC Derivative Markets, in PETER
MOOSLECHNER, HELENE SCHUBERTH, & BEAT WEBER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL
MARKET REGULATION-THE DYNAMICS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 186 (Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, UK, 2006)).
137. BASEL COMMITrEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS-A REVISED FRAMEWORK COMPREHENSIVE
(Version 2004, Updated 2006) [hereinafter Basel 11], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf
(last visited Aug. 1, 2009).
138. Id. at 40.
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calculated under either one of two methods according to the Basel II, the
Standardized or Internal Ratings Based approaches.
139
The need for banks to comply with Basel II's minimal capital
requirements encouraged financial institutions to find a way to decrease risk
exposure in order to free capital reserves. CDSs would limit the bank's
downside risk by passing the credit risk of loans onto other parties, thus
banks would be willing to loan out much more money expanding the
economy's access to capital. 140  For example, a bank holding mortgages
would be holding both the assets and risks of these instruments. Holding
the risks meant the bank had to maintain certain levels of capital in reserves
to ensure financial stability if the mortgages defaulted. Therefore, banks
would transfer risks through securitized assets and CDSs. The bank could
increase cash, reduce risk, and thus reduce the necessary capital reserves by
selling the asset or debt's risk, thus permitting the bank to comply more
easily with the Basel II. 14 1 Basel II required banks to hold capital reserves
when "significant credit risk has not been transferred to a third party...
[,],,142 so the banks increased CDS usage to transfer significant credit risks
to third parties, making the retention of loans less risky.
Not only did banks want to use CDSs to transfer risk, Basel II even
identified CDSs as a credit risk mitigation technique. As banks began to
recognize risk mitigation techniques, banks increased the use of credit
derivatives, such as CDSs. A bank using a CDS does not alleviate it from
needing capital reserves; rather the CDS reduces the capital reserve amount
because holding a CDS for a loan is less risky than solely holding the
loan. 143  Strong incentives increased the use of CDSs; however this
increased usage dramatically increased the banks' exposure to counterparty
risks among financial institutions while dispersing credit risks among
financial institutions.144 Thus, it is unlikely the banks actually reduced
overall risk, but rather increased risk exposure.
139. Unterman 2008, supra note 43, at 119. "The 'standardized approach' is reliant upon
external credit rating agencies to determine the risks associated with a financial institution's holdings.
For these ratings to be accepted they must be from agencies recognized by domestic banking regulators.
The 'internal ratings based approach' allows financial institutions to develop their own internal rating
system based on certain stipulated guidelines." Id.
140. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 83, at 1024-25.
141. See Unterman 2008, supra note 43, at 120.
142. Basel I, supra note 137, at 554.
143. See Chris Kentouris, Basel II Draws Attention to CDS Risk Management, SECURITIES
INDUSTRY NEWS, July 26, 2004, http://www.moodyskmv.com/newsevents/mc/mc07262004_sin.html
(last visited August 1, 2009).
144. See Arner, supra note 6, at 110-11.
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As with the ISDA's initiatives discussed prior, Basel II is not law but
rather is a model that national regulatory regimes are encouraged to adopt.
"This [Basel II] is being circulated to supervisory authorities worldwide
with a view to encouraging them to consider adopting this revised
Framework at such time as they believe is consistent with their broader
supervisory priorities.' '145 Therefore, not all nations have adopted Basel II
in unison; rather, regimes adopt certain portions, the whole accord, or none
of it. 146 Also, Basel II, if adopted, only applied to commercial banks and
not other financial institutions such as hedge funds, pension funds, private
investment funds, insurance companies, or investment banks.
47
Furthermore, capital requirements underestimated the risk of CDSs and
require clearer and more effective guidance to measuring and disclosing
these CDS risks in the future. 148
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO OVERHAUL THE CDS MARKET
The recent financial turbulence emerged because there were too many
gaps in the regulatory system where financial products operated in the
shadows. 149 There are currently many different views on whether the CDS
market necessitates regulation or oversight, and if so to what extent and
how to implement it. Prior to the 2007-08 global financial turmoil, U.S.
federal banking agencies issued guidance for supervising and regulating the
OTC derivative market, although never mandatory rules. 150 The focus was
on credit risk management, capital adequacy and regulatory capital
reserves, and disclosure of risk.151 Government banking agencies declared
that banks needed to include credit derivatives into their risk-based capital
145. Basel 11, supra note 137, at 3.
146. See, e.g., FINANCIAL STABILITY INSTITUTE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW CAPITAL
ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK IN NON-BASEL COMMITTEE MEMBER COUNTRIES (Sept. 2006), available at
http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers06.pdfnofi-ames=l (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
147. See Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-Structured Finance and Credit Market
Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 53, 104 (2009).
148. See Unterman 2008, supra note 43, at 120.
149. COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A
PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM, RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE SYSTEMIC RISK AND MAKE
MARKETS MORE TRANSPARENT (May 2009).
150. See, e.g., FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR
CREDIT DERIVATIVES (Aug. 1996) [hereinafter FDIC Report]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL BANKS (Aug. 1996) [hereinafter OCC
Report].
151. Sheerer, supra note 10, at 179-80.
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computations, 2 signifying that certain credit derivatives would require the
banks to hold higher levels of capital reserves for the increased risks
derived from these credit derivatives. Therefore, banks were being advised
by the government to hold capital reserves in relation to their risk exposure
to the underlying reference assets.'53
Whether a credit derivative was considered in calculating risk-based
capital reserves depended on the credit risk protection provided by the
credit derivative. Banks could avoid meeting the capital reserve
requirements by offsetting one credit derivative with another credit
derivative. This "back-to-back" credit derivative position was used to
mitigate risk by hedging credit derivatives from one entity with credit
derivatives from another.1
54
Since the commencement of the global financial crisis, governments
around the world were forced to rethink the current regulatory system for
financial markets, especially within the United States. Several groups in the
United States and the United Kingdom have issued detailed reports
addressing the financial crisis with recommendations to resolve the crisis
and avoid similar future crises. The two most commonly argued regulatory
transformations are the creation of a mandatory centralized clearinghouse
for CDS transactions and a ban on "naked" CDSs. 155 The Committee on
Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR) released a report in May 2009 in
direct response to the financial crisis to promote effective regulation,
increase investor protection through increased market transparency, and
develop a global solution.
56
A centralized clearinghouse for CDS transactions would reduce
counterparty and systemic risks and increase market transparency and
liquidity. 57 The clearinghouse will reduce counterparty risk by becoming
the counterparty to every CDS transaction. Rather than a regulating agency
152. OCC Report, supra note 150, at 9.
153. See FDIC Report, supra note 150, at 4-5; OCC Report, supra note 150, at 7.
154. See Sheerer, supra note 10, at 181.
155. A naked CDS transaction is one where the protection buyer has no risk exposure to the
underlying, reference entity or asset. Therefore, "naked" CDSs are not considered to hedge risk, but
rather are mere speculative bets that may actually increase risks within the CDS market.
156. COMMITrEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, TlE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, A
PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM (May 2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-
CCMRReport_(5-26-09).pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2009) [hereinafter CCMR Report].
157. See generally id. at 38-49. See also COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP
II, CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISK: THE ROAD TO REFORM 125-30 (Aug. 2008) [hereinafter CRMPG II
Report]; United States Department of the Treasury, Treasury Outlines Framework For Regulatory
Reform, Provides New Rules of the Road, Focuses First on Containing Systemic Risk, March 26, 2009
[hereinafter U.S. Treasury Press Release].
20091 Dutt
ILSA Journal of Int 'l & Comparative Law
having to track CDS market activity through each entity engaged in the
activity, the clearinghouse will monitor and record all CDS transactions.' 58
Backlogged transactions would no longer exist, a problem common in the
CDS market without an automated clearinghouse. 5 9  Further, the
clearinghouse would require all CDS parties to post collateral and the
clearinghouse would actively manage the collateral postings on a daily
basis, demanding additional margin calls in response to a devaluation of the
reference entity, obligation, or asset.
60
There are currently three United States-based entities working to get a
CDS clearinghouse for the market.' 6' The same initiatives are currently
underway in Europe, one in the United Kingdom under the watch of the
Financial Services Authority (FSA), and the other in cooperation with the
European Central Bank (ECB).162  These clearinghouses have gained
approval in the United States and recently gained approval in the European
Union as well.
63
However beneficial a CDS clearinghouse would be for the financial
markets, it does not come without costs and problems of its own. The
initiation of a clearinghouse raises a substantial question, should all CDS
contracts be forced to go through a clearinghouse? Having all CDSs
conducted through a clearinghouse would likely reduce systemic risk and
increase the ease for the governmental agency to monitor transactions.
However, this massive standardization of CDS contracts may greatly reduce
the usage and benefit of a financial product that is highly customized to
meet each party's requests.' 64  Although clearinghouses are currently
transacting with CDS contracts, not all CDSs will be able to trade through a
clearinghouse due to their customized design. 165 Essentially, to a certain
extent, market participants will decide which CDSs contain enough
158. See CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 42.
159. See Tijoe, supra note 130, at 408-10. The large amount of unconfirmed CDS trades
creates a confirmation backlog. Backlogged transactions raise the risk that the CDS will not be honored
upon the occurrence of the credit event. Further, this increases counterparty and systemic risks because
an entity or investor cannot be certain which entities hold CDSs.
160. See CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 42.
161. See id. at 42-43.
162. See id. at 44.
163. Neil Shah, EU Derivatives Revamp Plan Puts Bankers on Edge, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
July 3, 2009, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124655644071187209.html (last visited
Aug. 1, 2009).
164. See CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 46-47.
165. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SYSTEMIC RISK: REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND
RECENT INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS RISK POSED BY CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 22 (Mar. 2009), available at
httpJ/www.gao.gov/new.items/d09397t.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).
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standardization to be cleared through a clearinghouse. Yet certain
standardized, high-volume CDSs will require clearinghouse confirmation,
no matter the interests of the parties involved, thus creating a group of
exchange-traded CDSs.
66
Not all CDSs can be directed through a clearinghouse; some are so
complex and customized that a clearinghouse transaction is highly
inefficient and costly. Rather than force these CDSs to a clearinghouse, the
parties to the CDS will be required to hold additional capital reserves to
adjust for the lack of clearinghouse oversight and collateral requirements to
minimize counterparty and systemic risks.167  Additionally, non-
standardized CDS trades will be reported to trade repositories and follow
the clearinghouse standards for netting, collateral and margin calls, and
settlement practices.168 Therefore, CDS legislation requires more than a
clearinghouse initiative in order to minimize counterparty and systemic
risks while easing the regulatory agency's ability to monitor the
transactions.
Because CDS transactions span the globe, the number of active CDS
clearinghouses and their jurisdiction will dictate regulatory efficiency.
Having one or two centralized clearinghouses is more efficient than
multiple ones;169 a global market is more manageable when information is
condensed into a small number of entities, making oversight easier. But a
small number of global clearinghouses will raise two concerns. First, which
governmental agency will oversee these entities? This will require
extensive international cooperation. Second, the more centralized the CDS
transactions, the greater the systemic risk because a few entities hold all the
counterparty and other risks. The regulatory oversight will need to be strict
and the clearinghouses' collateral and capital reserves will need to be
accurately and intensely pursued and monitored in order for the
clearinghouse initiatives to be effective.
170
Once the clearinghouses begin to clear all the CDS transactions, the
issue of how to organize and present the trade data arises. The current
dilemma is the ambiguous state of the CDS market, particularly regarding
actual CDS contract prices, price quotes, trade confirmations, trade
166. See CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 50-54.
167. See id. at 56.
168. U.S. Treasury Press Release, supra note 157.
169. See Darrell Dufflie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce
Counterparty Risk? 13 (Stan. U. Graduate Sch. of Business, Working Paper No. 2022, July 2009),
available at http://www.stanford.edu/-duffie/DuffieZhu.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).
170. See CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 47-48.
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volumes, and parties to CDSs.'7 ' An information-gathering computer
model like the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) 172 would
capture, organize, and distribute consolidated information on these CDS
transactions to the public. Market aggregate statistics would provide recaps
of real-time CDS activity, including the number of CDS transactions and
the total notional amount traded, as well as advances, declines, bid-ask
spreads, and 52-week highs and lows.
173
All this information would supply the much needed price transparency
to the CDS market, while potentially decreasing transaction costs. 174 As
stated by former Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, "[ilnformed
investors, armed with accurate information, ensure that market prices
represent fair values. And fair market prices, in turn, ensure that the
markets perform their economic function of efficiently allocating capital
resources."' 175 By providing the public with CDS market transparency,
investors will make improved investment decisions, thus reducing risks and
increasing regulatory dexterity.
For those entities trading in CDSs, the entity will need to register with
the regulatory agency and meet eligibility requirements. Further, CDS
trading entities will need to meet all the recordkeeping and disclosure
requirements, as determined by the regulatory agency.
176
One last and potentially vital role of a clearinghouse is the ease at
which CDS contracts could be "netted." Similar to the ISDA Master
Agreement's "close-out netting" provision, a similar clearinghouse standard
would obligate parties holding several outstanding CDSs with one another
to calculate one settlement amount by offsetting the total amounts owed to
each other.177  Thus, netting would identify and reduce unnecessary
171. Seeid.at48.
172. TRACE was established through a merger of the NASD with the member regulation,
enforcement, and arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange. See Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement Governance and Related
Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and
NYSE Regulation, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-56145 (July 26, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007/34-56145.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).
173. CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 49. See also U.S. Treasury Press Release, supra note
148.
174. CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 49.
175. Unterman 2009, supra note 147, at 87.
176. U.S. Treasury Press Release, supra note 157.
177. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW-A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO
THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 81 (March 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/tumerreview.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
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redundancies in CDS gross exposures. 78 By closing out the existing CDS
exposures, parties can reduce economic risk exposure while increasing
accurate information of an entity's position in CDS contracts because
replacement losses are minimalized and merged to form one transaction.
1 79
The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
(G-20) fully support an international clearinghouse for OTC derivative
transactions:
Supervisors and regulators, building on the imminent launch of
central counterparty services for credit default swaps (CDS) in
some countries, should: speed efforts to reduce the systemic
risks of CDS and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives
transactions; insist that market participants support exchange
traded or electronic trading platforms for CDS contracts; expand
OTC derivatives market transparency; and ensure that the
infrastructure for OTC derivatives can support growing
volumes. 180
However, critics of CDS clearinghouses claim that these institutions
are not as beneficial as regulators and academics may think. CDSs are
complex and customized financial products making it difficult to properly
assess and value the risks of each party to each contract.1 81 Sellers of CDSs
are likely to have an information advantage over a clearinghouse in
assessing the risks associated with the transaction, making a clearinghouse
less efficient at assessing the risks. Clearinghouses do not have the
resources to check every party's balance sheet for other risks, thus they do
not adjust CDS transaction margins for the risks the parties carry from other
investments. What this signifies is that margins are roughly the same for
each party to a CDS because the margins are based on the specific CDS
transaction, not the other risks a party holds in other investments. Sharing
risks through a clearinghouse may incentivize parties to undertake more
risk elsewhere, making a clearinghouse not as efficient a risk sharer as once
thought and promoted.
182
178. Id. at 81-83.
179. Id.
180. GROUP OF TwENTY FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS (G-20),
DECLARATION OF THE SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 3 (Nov. 15,2008),
available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summitdeclaration.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
181. Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, REGULATION 48, Vol. 31, No. 4, 44, 48 (Winter
2008-2009).
182. See id.
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If systemic risk is caused by the interconnectedness of large financial
institutions, then a clearinghouse will not solve the systemic risk problem.
What a clearinghouse needs to accomplish is to force parties to take smaller
amounts of CDSs with smaller values and risks as compared to party-to-
party transactions; riskier party's need to post higher margins and engage in
fewer CDSs. 183 To complete this, a clearinghouse must expend resources to
accurately appraise a party's risks outside the CDS transaction and adjust
the margins appropriately. If the clearinghouse fails to charge higher
margins for party's carrying more risk, the clearinghouse increases systemic
risk because the clearinghouse is undercapitalized given the risks it holds in
comparison to the collateral it holds.' 4
Finance professionals, politicians, and academics have shown a strong
split of opinions as to the need for banning "naked" CDS transactions.
185
Legislation prohibiting the trading of "naked" CDSs would potentially
reduce the $29 trillion CDS market by almost eighty percent, roughly $23
trillion. 186  "This would basically kill the single-name CDS market ...
[g]iven the small size of many issuers' bonds outstanding, this would make
it practically impossible for the CDS market to exist."'
' 87
"Naked" CDS transactions raise the issue of the protection buyer's
incentives under the contract. A protection buyer who does not own the
underlying reference asset nor has any connection to the reference entity
has an incentive to destroy the value of the reference obligation or entity. 88
For example, say your neighbor is able to purchase a CDS with your home
as the underlying reference asset and the credit event is the destruction of
your home. The insurance company that sold your neighbor the CDS has a
strong incentive to ensure that your house is not destroyed because the
insurance company wants to receive premium payments and not pay money
out. Your neighbor who purchased the CDS has an incentive to destroy
your house as soon as possible because he wants to pay as little as possible
183. See id. at 49-50.
184. Seeid.at 51.
185. "Naked" CDS transactions involve a purchaser of the CDS contract who has no risk
exposure to the underlying, reference obligation. The reason these "naked" CDS transactions are so
controversial is because the purchaser is not directly hedging risk, but rather is merely speculating in the
market. Thus, some believe that an entity purchasing a CDS must have a direct risk caused by the
change in the underlying, reference obligation's value.
186. Matthew Leising, U.S. Draft Law Would Ban Most Trading in Credit-Default Swaps,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 29, 2009, available at
http://agonist.org/20090129/u a draft law-would-ban-most-tradingincreditdefault swaps (last
visited Aug. 2, 2009).
187. Id. (quoting Tim Backshall, Chief Strategist at Credit Derivatives Research LLC).
188. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 83, at 1035.
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in premiums, yet collect on the face value of the CDS contract. Your
neighbor will benefit more from the destruction of your house than if you
are able avert its destruction.
This illustrates the same situation when a speculator purchases a CDS
against the default of a company or devaluation of an asset. Typically, an
investor who owns an entity's assets or debt instruments wants the entity to
remain financially healthy in order to earn higher returns on the
investment. 189 However, CDS purchasers would rather see the entity fail
and default in order to collect the face value of the CDS contract because it
is more profitable than permitting the entity to remain viable.' 90 By not
owning or otherwise having an interest in the underlying reference asset,
obligation, or entity, the speculator stands to earn a larger profit from the
occurrence of a credit event than the nonoccurrence. Therefore, the fear is
that speculative CDS holders will do what it can to ensure the downfall of
the underlying asset, entity, or obligation.' 9'
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has supported the termination of
physically settled CDSs. 192  CDS contracts should be standardized to
eliminate the need for a purchaser of a CDS to physically deliver
obligations of the reference entity following a default or other credit
event.' 93 The problem with physically settled CDSs arises because there is
currently more credit derivatives issued than the value of underlying
reference assets. This is caused by the large amount of speculators buying
"naked" CDS contracts. 194 If entities hold a large number of speculative
CDSs that are to be physically settled and a credit event develops trigging
CDS settlement, a rush will occur to acquire the underlying reference assets
to satisfy settlement. This artificially inflates the value of the underlying
reference assets.'
95
This exact situation occurred when Delphi Corporation (Delphi) went
bankrupt. CDS protection sellers demanded physical settlement but not all
the counterparties owned the underlying Delphi bonds to complete the
settlement transactions. The protection buyers were forced into the market
to buy the bonds, unnaturally inflating the bond values because Delphi was
189. See Young, McCord & Crawford, supra note 2, at 2.
190. See id.
191. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 83, at 1035.
192. FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON
ENHANCING MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE 21 (April 2008), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publicationslr_0804.pdf?noframes=l (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
193. Id.
194. See Tijoe, supra note 130, at400.
195. See id.
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currently in bankruptcy. The CDS market pushed the Delphi bond market
to new highs causing confusion among parties not privy to the CDSs, and
protection buyers had to pay artificially high prices to settle the CDS
contracts.1
96
Recent years have seen a shift from the historical cost accounting
methods toward the mark-to-market accounting in response to a perceived
need for more relevant financial information from publicly-traded
companies to the public and investors. 97  Mark-to-market accounting
assigns a value to a position held in an asset or debt based on the current
fair market price for the asset or debt. Therefore, mark-to-market
accounting allows for the temporary changes in valuation of an asset,
usually on a daily or weekly basis.
The Federal Accounting Standard (FAS) 133, Accounting for
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, requires all derivative
instruments to be measured at fair value using mark-to-market accounting
techniques. 98 Proponents of this method argue that adjusting assets to their
fair value on a regular basis informs investors of the risks and values of the
company. Furthermore, because market prices are reliable and accessible,
objectivity and transparency of a company's financial status is enhanced. 199
However, the CDS market is largely opaque with illiquid prices and
unreliable CDS contract values, making the calculation of CDS fair values
inaccurate.
Critics of mark-to-market accounting state that it may increase
instability in the financial markets. Financial institutions typically hold a
large variety of assets and debts that exhibit normal market fluctuations in
prices. These assets and debts are the underlying reference obligations for a
CDS contract, and the fluctuation in the asset and debt prices cause the
CDSs to fluctuate in value.200  During an economic downturn-like the
2007-08 global financial crisis-financial institutions are continually
forced to write-down their assets. Firms need to sell their assets to
anticipate the suspected drops in asset prices that force these write-downs.
196. See id, at 401-02.
197. See CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 176. Historical cost accounting records an asset
into the company's books at its purchase price. Throughout its life, the asset is reported without
adjustments made for inflation or temporary changes in valuation. It may be written down if it becomes
impaired or systematically depreciated and a gain can be reported only when the asset is sold or
otherwise properly disposed of or terminated.
198. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (FASB), STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 133, ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING
ACTIVITIES 5 (June 1998).
199. See CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 176.
200. See id. at 176-77.
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These asset sell-offs exacerbate the decline in market prices of CDSs,
adding additional illiquidity to an already illiquid market, while
simultaneously increasing the probability for credit event occurrences, thus
increasing counterparty and systemic risks.201
Some believe that mark-to-market accounting should prevail in times
of regular economic activity, but when the market takes a downswing,
regulators would have businesses switch back to the historical cost
accounting method.20 2 Thus, the regulatory body decides when the market
has normalized so mark-to-market accounting would be reinstated until
another economic disruption occurs.20 3 Others believe that mark-to-market
accounting should be abandoned all together in markets that are inactive or
illiquid, such as the CDS market.2 4
Given that mark-to-market accounting remains as is, there are
propositions that would make this accounting method more transparent and
standardized across all markets. First, create an additional disclosure of all
the assumptions and estimates underlying the valuation of assets and debts
that the company currently holds.20 5 This would help alleviate the cloud
currently surrounding the CDS market because investors could more fully
understand a company's concentration of risks and potential benefits for its
credit derivative holdings.20 6
Second, initiate and enforce an additional accounting disclosure that
would present both the market and credit value of a company's asset
holdings.20 7 This additional disclosure arises because "it is very difficult to
present a single 'fair' value for an asset, particularly in inactive markets and
201. See Guillaume Plantin, Haresh Sapra & Hyun Song Shin, Fair Value Accounting and
Financial Stability 5-10 (July 2008) (unpublished paper, prepared for the Financial Stability Review of
the Banque de France), available at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/haresh.sapra/docs OP/Fair%2OValue%2OAccounting%2and%2OFinan
cial%20Stability.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
202. See CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 177.
203. See id.
204. See Mike Leyland, Fair Value: Fool's Value, ACCOUNTANCY AGE (Sept. 20, 2007),
available at http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/comment/2199136/fair-value-fool-value
(last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
205. Stephen G. Ryan, Accounting in and for the Subprime Crisis 4-5, 32, 47 (Mar. 2008)
(unpublished essay), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=l115323 (last
visited Aug. 2, 2009). See also Scheerer, supra note 10, at 186 (discussing the Basel Committee's and
International Organization of Securities Commission's recommendations for increased disclosure
standards for banks trading and hedging with credit derivatives).
206. See Ryan, supra note 205, at 42-43.
207. See CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 183. Market value is the current price at which an
asset is trading in an observable exchange market. Credit value is an asset's intrinsic worth, as
determined by the cash flow characteristics of the asset and its contractual provisions.
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distressed circumstances. 2 °8  This new accounting approach requires
financial institutions to disclose the market values and credit values of each
asset separately and independently of each other. The first disclosure would
reflect strict market value based on observable market inputs only,
unadjusted for inactivity or distress. The second disclosure would reflect
credit value based on a fundamental appraisal of expected long-term
performance established independently of market inputs.20 9 The disclosure
should give investors heightened clarity and choice in determining overall
investment risk, thereby reducing information asymmetries and enhancing
investor protection. 210  Lastly, additional disclosures and increased
institutional transparency will ease the job of regulators overseeing CDS
transactions and enforcing CDS regulations.
On November 15, 2008, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB)211 implemented a new accounting rule requiring enhanced
disclosures about an entity's derivative and hedging use in order to provide
additional transparency of financial reporting.212 Entities are required to
provide disclosures about how and why an entity uses derivative
instruments, how derivative instruments are accounted for under FASB
Statement No. 133 and its related interpretations, and how derivative
instruments affect an entity's financial position, performance, and cash
flows. 213 By requiring this additional disclosure, investors and regulators
will better understand derivative use in terms of the risks involved and how
an entity plans to manage with them. Further, by disclosing the fair value
of the derivatives and their gains and losses in a table format, a complete
picture can be seen as to an entity's position in derivatives before, during,
and after the reporting period.214
208. Id. at 183.
209. Id. at 184. See also IASB Provides Update on Applying Fair Value in Inactive Markets,
(International Accounting Standards Board, London, UK), Oct. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/2F9525FD-4671-439D-BO8E-
27C 18C8 I C238/0/PRFairValue I02008.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
210. CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 185.
211. The FASB is a not-for-profit, private organization whose primary mission is to develop,
create, and modify the generally accepted accounting principles throughout the United States. The
FASB is to act in the public's best interest and sets the accounting standards for all the U.S. public
companies.
212. FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 161, DISCLOSURES
ABOUT DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES I (mar. 2008).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 2.
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Currently, there is a raging debate as to which federal agency, if any,
has jurisdiction over the CDS market.215 To further complicate the matter,
state insurance commissions are making arguments that a CDS is so similar
to an insurance contract that each state should have the authority to regulate
CDS contracts under state insurance laws.216 With all these substantial
recommendations to be implemented to regulate the CDS market, which
regulatory agency should head the reforms and oversight?
217
One recommendation is to reorganize the current United States
overlapping sectoral model of federal regulation by creating two or three
independent federal regulatory bodies overseeing the U.S. financial
system.218  This model would retain the current Federal Reserve Bank
(FRB) while establishing one or two additional governmental bodies from
the existing regulatory agencies. The newly created United States Financial
Services Authority (USFSA) would consist of the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
215. McMahon & Collins, supra note 40. CDSs cannot be easily categorized as either a
security under the supervision of the SEC or as a future under the supervision of the CFTC. This sets
the stage for arguing that CDS regulation should be a participant-based approach, meaning that CDSs
would only be regulated by regulating the entities that hold the contracts. Further, this fuels the
argument that the United Stated needs to completely renovate the federal regulatory system by creating
one, central financial market regulator.
216. See, e.g., Update on Regulation of Credit Default Swaps, Special Bulletin (Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan, LLP, New York, NY), Feb. 12, 2009, at 3-4, available at
http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub7l2.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2009). The Missouri Department of
Insurance requires all sellers of covered CDSs conducting business within Missouri to obtain a
certificate of insurance to transact business. Further, the National Conference of Insurance Legislators is
pushing for states to have the ability to regulate CDSs as insurance.
217. Currently, the United States employs more financial regulators and expends a higher
percentage of its GDP on financial regulation than any other major nation. Compared to the United
Kingdom, the United States employs 38,700 staff to do the same job as the 3,100 in the United
Kingdom. Further, the United States spends $497,984 per billion dollars of GDP, versus the $276,655
by the United Kingdom. Yet recent events show that the United States' larger staff and greater funding
have not resulted in more efficient regulation. See Committee on Capital Markets Regulation Releases
Recommendations for Reorganizing US. Regulatory Structure (CCMR, Cambridge, MA), Jan. 14, 2009,
at I [hereinafter CCMR Press Release].
218. See CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 203-10. The FRB would retain its exclusive control
of monetary policy and its lender-of-last-resort function as part of its key role in ensuring financial
stability. The USFSA would regulate all other aspects of the financial system, including market
structure, permissible activities and safety and soundness for all financial institutions. The
investor/consumer protection body would monitor the safety and soundness of regulatory actions; any
conflict between the supervisory and investor/consumer protection body should be resolved by the U.S.
Treasury Department. Id.
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(CFTC).219  Additionally, an independent investor/consumer protection
agency would be either merged into the USFSA or created as an
independent agency.
220
Because the United States is the financial market leader and the largest
recipient of foreign investment, the United States has a distinct and
important place in the world. Financial regulation needs to reflect the
breadth and significance of the United States on the world stage. The
current fragmented United States regulatory system reduced each federal
agency's efficiency and resources because the agencies competed for
jurisdiction over different sectors of the market.22' Most nations no longer
employ the fragmented, sectoral model used by the United States. For
example, Australia and the Netherlands employ a central bank and then two
federal regulators, while the United Kingdom and Japan employ one central
bank and one federal regulator.222 An Australian professor recently wrote
that "Australia's three peaks of market regulation contrast with the
'alphabet soup' of US derivatives regulation watchdogs .... ,223 The
Economist wrote that "the crisis has exposed the SEC as a cracked piston in
a sputtering regulatory engine that dates back to the 1930s.,,224 Even the
Chairman of the CFTC, Walter Lukken, has called for an "objective-based"
regulatory system that would merge federal government agencies to form a
new system consisting of three agencies: Systemic Risk Regulator, Market
Integrity Regulator, and Investor Protection Regulator.225
Consolidated financial regulation can achieve four goals:
219. Id. at 203. The CCMR could not reach a consensus at to the division of regulatory power
as to financial institutions between the FRB and the USFSA. Some believe the FRB should regulate all
financial institutions, some believe the USFSA should regulate all financial institutions, while others
want a split between the two institutions as to regulating financial institutions and markets. See CCMR
Report, supra note 156, at 206-08.
220. See id. at 203.
221. See CCMR Press Release, supra note 217, at 7. The fragmented U.S. regulatory structure
impaired the creation of sound international regulations of the CDS market prior to the recent financial
crisis.
222. CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 204.
223. Latimer, supra note 136, at 9.
224. Growing Insecurities; The Securities and Exchange Commission, ECONOMIST, January,
17, 2009, at 73, available at http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfin?storyid=12948655
(last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
225. Walter L. Lukken, Commissioner of the CFTC, Keynote Address Before FIA Futures and
Options Expo, Chicago, Illinois 3 (Nov. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@newsroonidocuments/speechandtestimony/opalukken-
50.pdf(last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
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1) consistent regulations across all sectors of the financial
markets;
2) attract and retain high quality staff and efficient assignment
of personnel where needed;
3) reduce the regulatory agency's ability to act in favor of
special interests rather than the public as a whole; and
4) enhance accountability. 226
Harmonization of the new United States regulatory standards is crucial
in the CDS market, which does not have national borders. The United
States will need to pressure the international community to adopt similar
regulations so that a vast network of domestic regulations can be formed.
This network of domestic regulations can be monitored by an international
forum that has the authority to enforce the network's regulations.227
Further, the international forum will need to have ample political and
economic resources to monitor shocks in the market and perform crisis
response.228 A crucial task of the international forum is to create regulatory
dialogue and promote efficient dispute resolution procedures.229
A lack of international regulatory cooperation will lead to regulatory
arbitrage. If a collection of nations employ strict CDS regulations while
other nations remain relaxed or unregulated, CDS transactions will move to
these lesser regulated nations. In a highly globalized market where national
borders do not exist, like the CDS market, international cooperation and
consistency is the only way to effectively regulate a market that spans the
globe.
On March 26, 2009, Secretary of the United States Treasury, Timothy
Geithner, testified before the House Financial Services Committee.
Secretary Geithner discussed the United States Treasury's framework for
regulatory reform: addressing systemic risk, protecting consumers and
investors, eliminating gaps in the United States regulatory structure, and
fostering international coordination.230  He stated that the lack of
transparency in the credit derivatives market, at least in part, lead to
regulator's failure to understand CDSs' potential ability to threaten the
entire financial system and bring down very large institutions, like AIG.
226. See CCMR Press Release, supra note 217, at 8.
227. See CCMR Report, supra note 156, at 212-13. The CCMR endorses the establishment of
a newly strengthened Financial Stability Board, provided it is flexible and expert enough to harmonize
baseline rules for the regulation of international finance while still taking a broad view of all the markets
in which modem financial conglomerates participate and interact. Id.
228. See id. at 212.
229. See id.
230. See U.S. Treasury Press Release, supra note 157.
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Secretary Geithner made a profound statement to the House Financial
Services Committee: "Let me be clear: the days when a major insurance
company could bet the house on credit default swaps with no one watching
and no credible backing to protect the company or taxpayers from losses
must end.",
231
VII. CURRENT PENDING U.S. LEGISLATIVE ACTION FOR THE CDS MARKET
Because of investor fears and lack of confidence coupled with the
recent bailouts and bankruptcies of major financial institutions, Congress
has been scrambling to determine the cause of this financial crisis in order
to create new financial standards and regulations. Not surprisingly,
Congress has focused some of its time and lawmaking authority to enact
legislation that will begin to regulate the CDS market, given the legislation
is approved. While Congress has currently initiated eight bills since the
start of 2009 through July 2009 that would directly address the CDS
market, not one of these bills is an end all solution to the current problem.
Hopefully, the bills are the first action in a line of many to come, in which
more meticulous and efficient regulation of the CDS market will prevail.
A. Derivatives Trading Integrity Act of 2009
On January 15, 2009, Senator Harkin introduced to the Senate the bill
entitled the Derivatives Trading Integrity Act of 2009 (DTIA of 2009).232
The purpose of the DTIA of 2009 is "[t]o amend the Commodity Exchange
Act to ensure that all agreements, contracts, and transactions with respect to
commodities are carried out on a regulated exchange, and for other
purposes. '233 The DTIA of 2009 would reverse most of the exemptions in
the CEA for OTC derivatives by eliminating the distinction between
contracts, agreements, and transactions in the "excluded" and "exempt"
commodity market from those transactions that are currently required to be
traded on regulated exchanges.234 Essentially, the DTIA of 2009 would
231. Timothy Geithner, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner
Written Testimony House Financial Services Committee Hearing (Mar. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg7l.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
232. Derivatives Trading Integrity Act of 2009, S. 272, 11 th Cong. (2009).
233. Id.
234. See S. 272 supra note 232, at §§ 2-3; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ la(10)-(1), 1 a(13)-(14), 1a(33),
2(c)-(e), 2(g)-(i), 6(a), 6(c), 6a, 6g(a), 6i, 7a, 7a-1, 7a-2, 7a-3, 7b, 8(b), 16(e). See also Senate Bill
Would Regulate OTC Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps, (CCH Financial Crisis News Center,
Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands), Jan. 19, 2009, available at
http:l/www.financialcrisisupdate.com/2009/0 I/senate-bill-would-regulate-otc-derivatives-and-credit-
default-swaps.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
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force all these "excluded" and "exempt" transactions to move onto
registered and regulated exchanges, including CDS transactions, so to be
monitored by the CFTC. 235 Thus, having all OTC derivatives traded on a
registered and monitored exchange, transparency, accountability, and
integrity of trading of CDSs, as well as other derivatives, should be greatly
increased and strengthened.236
The DTIA of 2009 addresses the issue of CDS market transparency by
forcing many, if not all, CDS transactions to take place on a regulated
exchange. CDS market information will then be readily available to
investors, the public, and regulatory agencies. Further, regulators can easily
monitor all CDS transactions, saving time and other resources while
promoting regulatory efficiency. With all the transaction information
collected and aggregated on a few exchanges, prices of CDSs will be more
accurate, thus reflecting the fair value of a company's credit risk.
However, the DTIA of 2009 contains some flaws. First, the bill makes
no attempt to address the standards that the clearinghouses would need to
implement, but rather leaves this decision to be determined at a later date.
It is of great importance to set margins, capital reserves, and fees on the
exchange, or else the exchange will not reduce risks and operate
inefficiently; yet this bill fails to address this issue.
Second, it fails to address the terms and definitions within the CDS
contracts; what is a standardized contract versus a customized contract?
Forcing all CDSs to trade and clear through a regulated exchange requires a
detailed analysis of which terms and definitions in a CDS contract are
optimal for the market because all CDS contracts will have to be highly
standardized. The bill fails to mention who is responsible for this
determination: regulators, market consensus, the exchanges, or individual
market participants.
Finally, forcing all CDSs to become standardized and clear through an
exchange will greatly hinder the market. The CDS market contains
contracts that are highly customized to the parties' needs. CDSs for
hedging tend to contain more customized terms than CDSs for speculation.
Thus, requiring all CDS contracts to become standardized could destroy the
CDS market as a whole, demolish CDSs for hedging purposes while
leaving the speculators only, or force CDS participants to develop a new
credit derivative that avoids regulation under the DTIA of 2009. Thus, the
235. See S. 272 supra note 232, at §§ 2-3; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ la(10)-(ll), Ia(13)-(14), la(33),
2(c)-(e), 2(g)-(i), 6(a), 6(c), 6a, 6g(a), 6i, 7a, 7a-1, 7a-2, 7a-3, 7b, 8(b), 16(e). See also CCH Financial
Crisis News Center, supra note 234.
236. See S. 272 supra note 232, at §§ 2-3; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ la(10)-(11), la(13)-(14), 1a(33),
2(c)-(e), 2(g)-(i), 6(a), 6(c), 6a, 6g(a), 6i, 7a, 7a-1, 7a-2, 7a-3, 7b, 8(b), 16(e). See also CCH Financial
Crisis News Center, supra note 234.
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DTIA of 2009 is quite simplistic and inflexible for a CDS market that deals
with contracts which require customization. So while the DTIA of 2009
carries benefits for the CDS market, it also carries heavy costs which could
potentially desolate this market.
B. Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009
Representative Peterson introduced the Derivatives Markets
Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009 (DMTA of 2009) to the
House of Representatives on February 11, 2009.237 The DMTA of 2009
plans "[t]o amend the Commodity Exchange Act to bring greater
transparency and accountability to commodity markets, and for other
purposes. 238 The DMTA of 2009 takes a broad, yet elaborate approach to
regulating the credit derivative market. The first section addressing the
CDS market is Section 5 of the bill. Section 5 demands all the exempt and
excluded OTC derivatives under the CEA to now meet the CFTC's
reporting, accounting, and recordkeeping requirements for a five-year
period.239 The CFTC gains the authority to gather data on any person's
OTC derivative transactions, including CDS positions, to prevent price
manipulation, any other disruption to market integrity, or prevent excessive
speculation throughout the marketplace. 240
Section 11 of the DMTA of 2009 gives the CFTC authority to
determine if the exempt and excluded OTC derivatives under the CEA have
the potential to:
(A) disrupt the liquidity or price discovery function on a
registered entity; (B) cause a severe market disturbance in the
underlying cash or futures market; or (C) prevent or otherwise
impair the price of a contract listed for trading on a registered
entity from reflecting the forces of supply and demand in any
market.
241
237. Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 977, 1Ilth Cong.
(2009).
238. Id.
239. See id. § 5.
240. See H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 5; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(2), 2(g), 2(h)(2)(A), 2(h)(4)(A),
6g(a), 6i. See also Credit Derivatives: Recent Regulatory Developments (Morrison & Foerster LLP,
San Francisco, CA), Apr. 20, 2009, at 3, available at
http://www.mofo.com/news/updatesfiles/O9042OCreditDerivatives.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2009).
241. See H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 11; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2(g), 2(h)(2)(A),
2(h)(4)(A), 12a(a)(9). See also Morrison & Foerster, supra note 240, at 3.
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If the CFTC makes one of these determinations to be true, then the
CFTC has the power to impose position limits on the relevant transactions,
to a level the CFTC deems proper.242 Basically, the authority granted under
Section 11 to the CFTC appears to permit the CFTC to limit-and perhaps
terminate-any privately-negotiated OTC transaction, including those
entered into between otherwise regulated entities, such as banks, broker-
dealers, and insurance companies. 43
The DMTA of 2009 promotes and gives the CFTC authority to
establish and monitor clearinghouses for OTC derivatives. Section 13
requires the "exempt" and "excluded" OTC derivatives under the CEA be
cleared and settled through a CFTC-registered clearinghouse. 2" For the
exempt and excluded OTC derivatives under the CEA that involve a
reference obligation that is a financial instrument (i.e. securities and bonds),
the DMTA of 2009 gives the SEC the authority to force these transactions
to be cleared and settled through a SEC-registered clearinghouse. 245 Also,
Section 13 explicitly denies the FRB the authority to regulate the clearing
and trading of OTC derivatives.
246
However, there is one twist in Section 13. If parties to an OTC
derivative transaction do not want to clear the transaction through one of the
clearinghouses, the parties may request the CFTC to permit no
clearinghouse transaction, but the parties must report the transaction and its
details directly to the CFTC. 47 These CFTC exemptions should be granted
for transactions that are highly customized, transacted infrequently, do not
serve a significant price discovery function in the marketplace, and are
242. See H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 11; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2(g), 2(h)(2)(A),
2(h)(4)(A), 12a(a)(9). See also Morrison & Foerster, supra note 240, at 3.
243. See H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 11; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2 (g), 2(h)(2)(A),
2(h)(4)(A), 12a(a)(9). See also Morrison & Foerster, supra note 240, at 3.
244. See H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 13; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2(g), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-I(b), 7a-I(c)(2), 27e; 12 U.S.C.A. § 4422 (West 2009). See also Morrison & Foerster, supra
note 240, at 3-4.
245. See H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 13; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(I)-(2), 2(g), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-l(b), 7a-l(c)(2), 27e; 12 U.S.C.A. § 4422 (West 2009). See also Morrison & Foerster, supra
note 240, at 3-4.
246. See H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 13; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2(g), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-l(b), 7a-l(c)(2), 27e; 12 U.S.C.A. § 4422 (West 2009). See also Morrison & Foerster, supra
note 240, at 3-4.
247. See H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 13; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2(g), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-I(b), 7a-1(c)(2), 27e; 12 U.S.C.A. § 4422 (West 2009). See also Morrison & Foerster, supra
note 240, at 3-4.
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entered into by parties that can demonstrate financial stability. 248 Further,
the parties must demonstrate the same financial integrity required by a
clearinghouse and meet similar collateral and margin standards established
by a clearinghouse. 249 Thus, without the CFTC exemption, the CDS will be
transacted through a registered clearinghouse, or not at all.
The last section and potentially the most controversial is Section 16.
Section 16 grants the CFTC the power to suspend trading in any CDS if the
CFTC believes the suspension of CDS trading is in the public interest or
needed to protect investors.2 However, before the CFTC may act in this
fashion, the CFTC must receive approval from the President of the United
States.25' It also contains a definition of a CDS, which, oddly enough, uses
the verb "to insure" as if a CDS functions as an insurance contract.112 "The
term 'credit default swap' means a contract which insures a party to the
contract against the risk that an entity may experience a loss of value as a
result of an event specified in the contract, such as a default or credit
downgrade. '253
It should be noted that an earlier draft of the DMTA of 2009 would
have prohibited any party from entering into a CDS unless the entity had a
direct exposure to the underlying reference asset, a "naked" CDS.
However, representatives of the ISDA, as well as other organizations,
successfully argued for the removal of this limitation, stating that it would
effectively turn all CDS contracts into insurance contracts and eliminate the
CDS business as we know it.254  Therefore, the DMTA of 2009 was
amended to remove this Section 16 prohibition of "naked" CDS
transactions.255
248. See H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 13; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1H2), 2(g), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-l(b), 7a-l(c)(2), 27e; 12 U.S.C.A. § 4422 (West 2009). See also Morrison & Foerster, supra
note 240, at 3-4.
249. See H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 13; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2(g), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-l(b), 7a-l(c)(2), 27e; 12 U.S.C.A. § 4422 (West 2009). See also Morrison & Foerster, supra
note 240, at 3-4.
250. H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 16(b). See also Morrison & Foerster, supra note 240, at 4.
251. See H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 16; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ la, 6c. See also Morrison &
Foerster, supra note 240, at 4.
252. H.R. 977, supra note 237, at § 16(b).
253. Id.
254. Orrick Financial Markets Client Alert, Over-the-Counter Derivatives and the Derivatives
Markets and Transparency Accountability Act of 2009, (Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, San
Francisco, CA), Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/1643.pdf (last visited
Aug. 2,2009).
255. See id.
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The DMTA of 2009 is more robust than the DTIA of 2009. Again, the
bill would establish CDS clearinghouses of which would be regulated by
the CFTC or SEC, depending on the underlying reference asset. CDS
market information will then be readily available to investors, regulatory
agencies, and the public. Thus, regulators can easily monitor all CDS
transactions, and the transaction information will be collected and
aggregated in a few number of registered clearinghouses. Furthermore, the
DMTA of 2009 does not require all CDSs to be standardized and cleared
through a clearinghouse, which will permit parties to customize CDS
contracts to each party's individual needs. However, the non-clearinghouse
transacted CDS will need to be recorded with the CFTC and meet the
margin and capital reserve requirements set by the clearinghouses. This
approach is much more flexible than that under the DTIA of 2009; it
reduces the need to set strict, standardized contract terms.
The bill gives the CFTC ample power to set speculative limits on CDS
transactions. If the CFTC believes CDS speculation has reached a level that
could harm the market, the CFTC may limit CDS transactions, or terminate
CDS transactions all together. The bill fails to set strict standards for when
the CFTC may act in this capacity; rather leaving the standards open to the
CFTC for later determination. This new power given to the CFTC can
prove both beneficial and detrimental to the CDS market, depending on the
standards that will govern a suspension or termination of CDS trading.
Perhaps, the CFTC may be receiving too much unchecked authority to limit
and control the CDS market.
The broad reporting requirements will be a small burden on the parties
to a CDS because most transactions will be conducted through a
clearinghouse. When these diminutive costs are compared to the great
benefit that investors and regulators will gain in a market that is currently
opaque, reporting CDS transaction data is the simplest form of oversight.
Large disclosure of CDS transaction information to regulators and investors
will reduce market manipulation, increase price accuracy, and give the
market the confidence it currently lacks. However, it is difficult to argue
that the CFTC's new authority is more injurious to the CDS market than the
current situation of having no authority in this marketplace.
C. Financial System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009
Representative Castle introduced the Financial System Stabilization
and Reform Act of 2009 (FSSRA of 2009) on March 26, 2009 in the House
of Representatives.256 FFSRA of 2009 intends "[t]o create a systemic risk
monitor for the financial system of the United States, to oversee financial
256. Financial System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1754, 111th Cong. (2009).
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regulatory activities of the Federal Government, and for other purposes.'257
Section 118 begins by including a definition of a CDS:
A bilateral derivative contract that transfers, in exchange for 1 or
more lump-sum or other payments, from 1 party to another, the
risk that an entity, regardless of whether owned by the buyer of
the protection, may experience a loss of value from a credit event
such as a default, credit downgrade, or other contractually
agreed-upon adverse event.
258
Further, Section 118 defines a credit default swap trading
clearinghouse as "an approved centralized clearinghouse for credit-default
swap trading that is designated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in consultation with the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System., 259 However, the CFTC has the lone authority to oversee
the activities of the clearinghouse. This CDS clearinghouse will need to be
adequately capitalized by CDS market participants, and the clearinghouse
may charge CDS parties a fee to create a default fund and impose trading
limits. 2
60
Also, Section 118 demands the CFTC to require any person holding,
maintaining, or controlling any position in a CDS traded through the
clearinghouse to keep records of the transactions for at least five years.26'
Therefore, the CFTC must establish rules for continuous reporting of these
CDS positions.262
In Section 120 of the FSSRA of 2009, any person that engages in a
CDS must utilize one of the designated clearinghouses to clear the
transaction.263 Section 120 does not require any other action under the CDS
to take place through the clearinghouse, such as the settlement of the
contract. 264  Further, the SEC has the authority to issue rules for the
257. Id.
258. Id. at § 118.
259. Id.
260. See H.R. 1754, supra note 256, at § 118; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(h), 6a(e). See also Morrison &
Foerster, supra note 240, at 4.
261. See H.R. 1754, supra note 256, at § 118; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(h), 6a(e). See also Morrison &
Foerster, supra note 240, at 4.
262. See H.R. 1754, supra note 256, at § 118; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(h), 6a(e). See also Morrison &
Foerster, supra note 240, at 4.
263. H.R. 1754, supra note 256, at § 120. See also Morrison & Foerster, supra note 240, at 4.
264. H.R. 1754, supra note 256, at § 120. See also Morrison & Foerster, supra note 240, at 4.
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clearance of a CDS and to enforce anti-fraud and anti-manipulation laws
regarding any and all CDS transactions.265
The largest provision of the FSSRA of 2009 would create the Financial
Stability Council (FSC). The FSC will serve independently from the
current federal regulatory structure as a systemic risk monitor.266
Therefore, the FSC would receive the power and authority to prevent and
mitigate the systemic risks throughout the financial system. 267 With this
power, the FSC can propose changes to regulatory policy, close regulatory
gaps, impose penalties, and impose rules onto financial institutions
regulating capital requirements, risk premiums, and long-term debt
conditions. 268 Because CDSs are used and traded among large financial
institutions, this bill will permit direct and indirect regulation of all CDS
transactions by use of regulated clearinghouses and the FSC.
This bill poses a similar problem as the exchange requirements under
the DTIA of 2009. Demanding that a CDS be cleared through a
clearinghouse will require a high level of standardization of CDS contracts.
In order for a clearinghouse to set margins, capital reserves, and fee
standards, the cleared CDS contracts will require highly standardized terms,
a counterproductive method to the current CDS market. The more
standardized are these CDS contracts, the less beneficial the CDSs will be
to the parties because a CDS for hedging purposes is designed to be
customized for each individual transaction. So the dilemma remains as to
the level of standardization necessary to make clearinghouses efficient and
beneficial, but not destroy the value that a CDS can serve for a financial
institution looking to hedge credit risks.
Also, only requiring a CDS transaction to be cleared through the
clearinghouse and nothing more could place gaps in CDS information
because parties can sell, trade, transfer, or novate a CDS after the initial
transaction without reporting this secondary transaction to the regulator,
unless the CFTC sets strict reporting standards. This means that either
party may decide that they no longer want to hold the risks derived from the
transaction, so they transfer the CDS to another party. Without the
secondary transaction having to go through a clearinghouse, CDSs may
return to an obscure market that existed prior to the legislation. This bill
may partially reduce this dilemma because any person holding, maintaining,
or controlling a CDS will need to keep records of it for five years. If this
statement translates to all secondary transactions will require confirmation
265. H.R. 1754, supra note 256, at § 120. See also Morrison & Foerster, supra note 240, at 4.
266. H.R. 1754, supra note 256, at § I11.
267. Id.§§ 112-13.
268. Id.
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through a clearinghouse, then all transactions will be recorded and
monitored. If it translates to only the original transaction will require
confirmation through a clearinghouse, then information regarding
secondary transactions will only surface when regulators examine an
entity's CDS records. The CFTC will need to address and create aggressive
reporting standards to ensure the constant reporting of CDS transactions.
D. Authorizing the Regulation of Swaps Act of 2009
The Authorizing the Regulation of Swaps Act of 2009 (ARSA of
2009) was introduced into the Senate on March 26, 2009 by Senators Levin
and Collins.269 This bill has a straightforward purpose, "[t]o authorize the
regulation of credit default swaps and other swap agreements, and for other
purposes., 270  The ARSA of 2009, if passed as law, would free multiple
federal regulators to regulate swap agreements, like CDSs, without
mandating how that regulatory authority is to be exercised. Because the
ARSA of 2009 aspires to create regulations for CDS transactions, the bill
eliminates several sections from previous federal statutes.
First, it deletes Sections 206A, 206B, and 206C of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLB Act).271 This invalidates the current definitions of "swap
agreement," "security-based swap agreement," and "non-security-based
swap agreement.,
272
Next, it deletes Section 2A of the Act of 1933 and Section 3A of the
Act of 1934 .273 This invalidates the certainty that swaps are not securities
under these Acts. However, swaps may or may not be considered securities
under these two Acts, there is no clear guidance set by this bill.274
269. The Authorizing the Regulation of Swaps Act, S. 961, 111th Cong. (2009).
270. Id. at § 2.
271. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; H.R. 5660, supra note 101, at § 301; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c
note. See also The Authorizing the Regulation of Swaps Act, (Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, New York,
NY), May 13, 2009, at 3, available at
http://www.davispolk.com/1485409/Clientmemos/2009/05.13.09.Levin.Collins.Bill.pdf (last visited
Aug. 4,2009).
272. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; H.R. 5660, supra note 101, at § 301; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c
note. See also Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 3.
273. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b-1, 78c-1. See also Davis Polk &
Wardwell, supra note 271, at 2.
274. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b-1, 78c-1. See also Davis Polk &
Wardwell, supra note 271, at 2.
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Further, it erases Sections 403, 404, and 407 of the Legal Certainty for
Bank Products Act.275  This abrogates the exemption of swaps from the
CEA and certain other recognized financial products used by banks.
276
Thus, CDSs entered into by banking institutions are no longer exempted
from federal regulation, with the CFTC now receiving authority to regulate
CDSs where at least one party is considered to be a banking institution.
Additionally, it cancels Section 2(d) of the CEA.277 This dissolves the
exclusion of swaps from most of the CEA provisions as agreements,
contracts, or transactions in "excluded commodities. ''278  Thereafter, it
deletes Section 2(g) of the CEA.279 This invalidates the exclusion of swaps
from most of the CEA provisions as agreements, contracts, or transactions
in "commodities other than agricultural commodities."280 Finally, it erases
Sections 2(h)(1) and 2(h)(2) of the CEA.281 This abrogates the exclusion of
swaps from most of the CEA provisions as agreements, contracts, or
transactions in "exempt commodities" as defined in Section la(14) of the
CEA.
282
Furthermore, it cancels Section 5(d) of the CEA.283 This dissolves the
ability to trade on an "exempt board of trade.' 2 4 To be an exempt board of
trade, an entity needs to limit trading on or through the facilities of the
board of trade to commodity contracts for sale for future delivery in which
the commodities have a nearly inexhaustible deliverable supply, a large
enough deliverable supply and liquid enough cash market to defeat fears of
275. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 27a-b, 27e. See also Davis Polk &
Wardwell, supra note 271, at 2.
276. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 27a-b, 27e. See also Davis Polk &
Wardwell, supra note 271, at 2.
277. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d), 2(g), 2(h)(1)-(2). See also Davis
Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 3.
278. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d), 2(g), 2(h)(1)-(2). See also Davis
Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 3.
279. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d), 2(g), 2(h)(1)-(2). See also Davis
Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 3.
280. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d), 2(g), 2(h)(1)-(2). See also Davis
Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 3.
281. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d), 2(g), 2(h)()-(2). See also Davis
Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 3.
282. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d), 2(g), 2(h)(1)-(2). See also Davis
Polk & Wardwell, supra note 27 1, at 3.
283. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-3. See also Davis Polk & Wardwell,
supra note 271, at 3.
284. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-3. See also Davis Polk & Wardwell,
supra note 271, at 3.
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manipulation, and no cash market and on which exchange only eligible
contract persons enter into contracts. 285  A CDS transaction met the
"exempt board of trade" definition because credit risk has a nearly
unlimited supply, the CDS market contains a significant number of
contracts and monetary value to create a large deliverable supply of
contracts to defeat manipulation fears, and CDSs have no cash market and
exchange where these CDS transactions occur.286
Lastly, Section 2 of the ARSA of 2009 deletes sections 301(b) and 304
of the CFMA.287 This provision eliminates the application of the Act of
1933's and Act of 1934's definition of "security" within the CFMA.2 ss
Also, it discards the savings provisions of the CFMA, which stated that the
CFMA would and could not be construed as finding or implying that a swap
agreement is or is not a security, futures contract, or commodity under
current federal laws.289
Section 3 of the ARSA of 2009 authorizes a:
Federal financial regulator [to] exercise oversight over (A) any
swap agreement that is entered into, purchased or sold by any
institution, entity or person ... that is subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal financial regulator; and (B) any swap agreement
that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal financial
regulator.
290
Furthermore, the "federal financial regulator" can "promulgate,
interpret, and enforce regulations, issue orders of general applicability, and
impose disclosure, reporting, or recordkeeping requirements, procedures, or
standards, relating to any swap agreement.,
291
Also, Section 3 provides the SEC absolute power to regulate swaps
traded on or cleared through exchanges or clearinghouses and the CFTC
plenary power to regulate swaps executed on, traded on, or cleared through
285. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-3. See also Davis Polk & Wardwell,
supra note 271, at 3.
286. S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2. It should be noted that section 2 of the ARSA of 2009
eliminates other sections from current federal laws; however, an analysis of these other invalidations is
not crucial for this Note's analysis of the CDS market.
287. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; H.R. 5660, supra note 101, at §§ 301(b), 304.
288. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; H.R. 5660, supra note 101, at § 301(b); 15 U.S.C.A. §§
77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10).
289. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 2; H.R. 5660, supra note 101, at § 304.
290. S. 961, supra note 269, at § 3.
291. S. 961, supra note 269, at § 3. See also Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 3-4.
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trading facilities or registered entities.292 The ARSA of 2009 clarifies that it
does not remove any authority previously provided to federal agencies to
regulate swaps.293
Lastly, the ARSA of 2009 seems to give many regulators authority to
regulate swap agreements, but it does not require any to exert such
294power. Rather, it requires a "federal financial regulator" to "consult,
work, and cooperate with other Federal financial regulators to promote
consistency in the treatment of swap agreements. 295
Compared to the three aforementioned pending congressional bills, the
ARSA of 2009 is the most expansive and complex. While the others
attempted to establish law with minimal modification to prior laws, this bill
heavily alters current federal statutes. The bill utilizes open-ended
definitions, possibly to ensure that nothing obstructs CDS regulation while
establishing a building block for later regulation. For example, the
definition of a "federal financial regulator" includes "any other Federal
agency that is authorized under any provision of Federal law to regulate any
financial institution or type or class of financial instrument or offering
thereof. 296  The expansive nature of the bill will make it adaptable for
unforeseen changes in financial markets, but may also include other
agencies not intended to have jurisdiction over CDSs.297 Disputes between
regulators may increase in frequency, thus utilizing resources on agency
conflicts rather than regulating the marketplace.298
This broad drafting creates ambiguity as to which federal agency
controls over the CDS market. The bill appears to separate the duties of the
SEC and the CFTC. It gives exclusive oversight and regulatory authority to
the SEC for securities exchanges and the CDSs traded or cleared within
these clearinghouses. 299 The CFTC will have authority over commodity
trading facilities or registered entities and all CDSs traded or cleared within.
However, then the bill provides that it may not limit or reduce the authority
292. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 3; 7 U.S.C.A. § la; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a). See also Davis
Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 4.
293. S.961, supra note 269, at § 3.
294. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 3; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(h)(3), 6(c); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a). See
also Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 4.
295. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 3; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(h)(3), 6(c); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a). See
also Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 4.
296. S. 961, supra note 269, at § 4.
297. See Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 5.
298. See id. at 4-5.
299. S. 961, supra note 269, at § 4. See also Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 5-6.
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of a "federal financial regulator" with respect to swaps.300 Thus, the bill
blurs the line as to which federal agency will regulate which entities and
which type of CDS contracts.30'
One major contradictory definition in the bill is the use of the term
"swap agreement." Under the bill, a "swap agreement" must be subject to
individual negotiation and entered into between eligible contract
participants. The SEC has expressed the definition that standardized,
centrally cleared swaps are not "individually negotiated. 30 2  Therefore,
swaps that are cleared and trade through an exchange or clearinghouse
would cease to fit within the SEC's definition of "swap agreement,"
limiting the SEC's authority to regulate certain CDS contracts.30 3 These
inconsistencies, among others, within this draft will demand future
legislation to clarify the ambiguities or federal regulators will be forced to
work out the details as the situation arises, which will likely be made in hast
as a quick fix.
3°4
The ARSA of 2009 incorporates an almost identical definition of a
"swap agreement" as used in the CFMA; which is a very broad
definition.30 5 This broad definition will include many types of financial
instruments, with the "federal financial regulators" having authority over
these "swap agreements. 30 6 Therefore, the federal financial regulators will
have to decide which agency will regulate which financial instrument, while
simultaneously bringing other transactions not currently under federal
regulation into the realm of federal regulation, such as insurance contracts.
E. Prevent Unfair Manipulation of Prices Act of 2009
Representative Stupak introduced the Prevent Unfair Manipulation of
Prices Act of 2009 (PUMP of 2009) to the House of Representatives on
May 14, 2009.307 The PUMP of 2009 plans "[t]o provide for regulation of
futures transactions involving energy commodities, to regulate credit
default swaps .. .and for other purposes."30 8 While this bill focuses on
300. S. 961, supra note 269, at § 4. See also Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 5-6.
301. S. 961, supra note 269, at § 4. See also Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 271, at 5-6.
302. See Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 27 1, at 7.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 6-7.
305. See S. 961, supra note 269, at § 4.
306. See Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 27 1, at 7.
307. Prevent Unfair Manipulation of Prices Act of 2009, H.R. 2448, 11 lth Cong. (2009).
308. Id.
[Vol. 16:1
2009]
regulating the energy derivatives market, it possesses consequences for the
CDS market as well.
Section 6 of the PUMP of 2009 would require all derivatives to be
traded and cleared through a registered clearing organization, including
CDSs, by eliminating many of the current exemptions and exclusions for
OTC derivatives. 30 9 However, the CFTC may waive the need for a CDS
transaction to be cleared through a registered clearing organization under
certain conditions.3 10  Before the CFTC may grant the clearinghouse
exemption, the CFTC must consult the primary regulator of the underlying
reference asset.311  The CDS transaction must be highly customized as to
the material nature of the contract's terms, transacted infrequently, not serve
a significant price-discovery function in the market, and the parties can
show financial integrity as determined by the CFTC.312  Further, the
transaction must be reported directly to the CFTC in a manner determined
by the CFTC.313 Lastly, the CFTC, SEC, and FRB will enter into a written
memorandum that discusses the details of this exemption.31 4
Section 7 makes it unlawful for anyone to trade in "naked" CDSs. 315
The PUMP of 2009 states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to enter into a credit default
swap unless the person (1) owns a credit instrument which is
insured by the credit default swap; (2) would experience financial
loss if an event that is the subject of the credit default swap
occurs with respect to the credit instrument; and (3) meets such
capital adequacy standards .... 316
Thus, at least one of the CDS participants must stand to experience a
financial loss regarding the underlying reference asset in the occurrence of
309. See H.R. 2448, supra note 307, at § 6; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 2(g), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-1(c)(2).
310. See H.R. 2448, supra note 307, at § 6; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 2(g), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-1(c)(2).
311. See H.R. 2448, supra note 307, at § 6; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 2(g), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-1(c)(2).
312. See H.R. 2448, supra note 307, at § 6; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 2(g), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-1(c)(2).
313. See H.R. 2448, supra note 307, at § 6; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-{2), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 2(g), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-1 (c)(2).
314. See H.R. 2448, supra note 307, at § 6; 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2(d)(1)-(2), 2(h)(1), 2(h)(3), 2(g), 6,
6(c)(1), 7a-1(c)(2).
315. See H.R. 2448, supra note 307, at § 7; 7 U.S.C.A. § 6c.
316. See H.R. 2448, supra note 307, at § 7; 7 U.S.C.A. § 6c.
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the credit event.31 7 Also, the CFTC has the authority to set and enforce
capital reserve requirements for all entities engaged in the CDS market.
31 8
This bill strikes a balance between forcing all CDSs to be cleared and
traded through a clearinghouse while permitting certain CDS contracts, the
ones that meet the aforementioned requirements, to remain outside the
clearinghouse. The CDS market is given the freedom to choose between
two options: either trade CDS contracts that are standardized by use of a
clearinghouse, or trade CDS contracts that are customized by use of the
OTC market but directly report the transaction information directly to the
CFTC.31 9  Given that the CFTC, SEC, and FRB create efficient and
effective regulations for monitoring and reporting CDS transaction
information, the PUMP of 2009 may prove highly beneficial to the
marketplace.
However, the one great pitfall within this bill is its complete
prohibition of "naked" CDS contracts. Outlawing all "naked" transactions
will greatly reduce the liquidity and price accuracy within the market. The
fewer transactions a market contains, the less liquid the instruments and the
more likely the prices of these instruments do not accurately reflect the true
price of risk. Because a majority of CDS transactions are "naked," and thus
speculative, an absolute banning of these transactions will greatly reduce
the size of the market; which could potentially cause the entire market to
cease. Thus, a prohibition of all "naked" CDSs is probably not the most
efficient answer, but rather placing certain limitations on this type of
transaction may better suit market efficiency and investor protection.
F. Credit Default Swap Prohibition Act of 2009
The Credit Default Swap Prohibition Act of 2009 (CDSP of 2009) was
introduced into the House of Representatives on July 9, 2009 by
Representative Waters.320  This bill's stated purpose is "[t]o amend the
securities laws to prohibit credit default swaps and to provide the Securities
317. See H.R. 2448, supra note 307, at § 7; 7 U.S.C.A. § 6c.
318. See H.R. 2448, supra note 307, at § 7; 7 U.S.C.A. § 6c. Section 7 also eliminates the
preemption of state bucketing laws regarding "naked" CDS transactions. This would permit state and
local governments to regulate or prohibit a brokerage enterprise from taking the opposite side of a
"naked" CDS transaction without the brokerage firm executing or reporting the transaction to a
regulated exchange.
319. The PUMP of 2009 permits CDS transactions to avoid the clearing requirement and be
classified as an exempt transaction if these transactions are highly customized as to the material terms
and conditions, are transacted frequently, and do not serve a significant price-discovery finction in the
marketplace. See H.R. 2448, supra note 307, at § 6(b). If the CDS transactions do not meet these three
requirements, then the transactions are to be cleared through a clearinghouse.
320. Credit Default Swap Prohibition Act of 2009, H.R. 3145, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
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and Exchange Commission with the authority to regulate swap
agreements., 321 The CDSP of 2009, if passed, would completely prohibit
the trading in all CDSs.322 The bill alters the definition of a CDS under the
Act of 1933 and 1934 by defining a CDS as:
(A) a swap agreement (as such term is defined in section 206A of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) that protects a party to such
agreement against the risk of a loss of value because of the
occurrence or non-occurrence of an event or contingency
specified in such agreement relating to a security, loan, or other
reference asset; and (B) such other forms of credit risk protection
as the Commission may, by rule, prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
323
Representative Waters plans for this definition to encompass all forms
and variations of CDS contracts, so that the bill is able to prohibit all
trading in the CDS market. Thus, to eliminate trading in CDS contracts, the
CDSP of 2009 amends the Act of 1934 by making it "unlawful for any
person to enter into a credit default swap agreement or contract. 324
Under this bill, the definition of a CDS may stand to not completely
eliminate all CDS trading as planned. First, the bill prohibits CDSs which
solely reference securities, loans, and other assets as the underlying
reference asset, not the CDSs that reference anything outside the definition
of an asset. So while this definition will likely eliminate the majority of
current CDS trading, parties will continue to trade in CDSs not referencing
assets, or rather find other means by which a CDS may indirectly reference
an asset. However, the bill gives the CFTC the authority to determine if
other forms of credit protection will be considered a CDS contract. So if
the CFTC decides to place these other forms of credit protection under the
jurisdiction of the CDSP of 2009, they would meet the definition of a CDS
and their trading would be prohibited.
Secondly, the definition is vague as to how the party must suffer the
"loss of value." If the transaction is a "naked" CDS, neither party has a risk
of "loss of value" regarding the underlying reference asset because neither
party owns the underlying reference asset. Therefore, if the "loss of value"
321. Id.
322. Id. § 4. The CDSP of 2009 also gives the SEC the authority to regulate other swap
agreements, notwithstanding the limitation placed on CDSs; however, because this analysis is outside
the realm of CDSs, it is not necessary for this Note. See id. § 3.
323. H.R. 3145, supra note 320, at § 3; 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b(a), 78c(a).
324. See H.R. 3145, supra note 320, at § 4; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g.
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definition in the CDSP of 2009 refers to the underlying reference asset, than
a "naked" CDS transaction is not restricted by this bill. If the transaction is
a CDS used for hedging, one party has the risk of "loss of value" regarding
the underlying reference asset because at least one party owns the
underlying reference asset. Therefore, the party owning the underlying
reference asset bears to suffer a "loss of value" given the credit event
occurs, so the CDSs for hedging will be banned under the bill. Because the
purpose of the bill is to prohibit all CDSs, the "loss of value" should refer to
the value of the party's position in the CDS contract. Therefore, at least
one party to the CDS stands to endure a "loss of value" because the parties
are in opposing positions; one party's gain is the other party's loss.
G. Transparent Markets Act of 2009
On July 9, 2009, Representative Larson introduced to the House of
Representatives the bill entitled the Transparent Markets Act of 2009 (TMA
of 2009).325 The purpose of the TMA of 2009 is "[t]o amend the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 to impose a tax on over-the-counter derivatives
transactions, and for other purposes. '326 The bill would permit the U.S.
Treasury Department to impose a tax on all covered derivative transactions.
The amount of this tax is 0.25% of the fair market value of the underlying
327
reference asset with respect to the derivative involved in the transaction.
Further, all the parties to the transaction will be held jointly and severally
liable for the imposed tax.328 The bill explicitly lists transactions which
would be subject to the tax, in which CDSs are one of these transactions to
be taxed.329
The term "covered derivative transaction," as used in this bill, refers to
any party to a derivative which is not traded on a qualified board or trade, as
defined by the Internal Revenue Code. 330  The Internal Revenue Code
defines the "qualified board or trade" as a national securities exchange
registered with the SEC, a domestic board of trade designated by the CFTC
as a contract market, or any other exchange, board of trade, or other market
which the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury determines as adequate for the
purposes of this definition. 33' Therefore, if the CDS contract does not meet
325. Transparent Markets Act of 2009, H.R. 3153, 111 th Cong. (2009).
326, Id.
327. H.R. 3153, supra note 325, at § 2.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1256(g)(7) (West 2009).
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the definition of a covered derivative transaction, then the tax will be
avoided by the transacting parties.
For this bill to impose the stipulated tax upon CDS transactions,
Congress cannot pass legislation forcing all CDSs to be traded through a
clearinghouse, or the like. The CDSs which transact through a qualified
board or trade (i.e. a registered clearinghouse) would avoid the tax imposed
by the TMA of 2009. Thus, if Congress passes a law which forces all CDS
transaction onto a registered clearinghouse, no CDS will fall under the bill's
definition of a covered derivative transaction, avoiding this federal taxation.
While the bill fails to provide for any regulatory authority by a federal
agency over the CDS market, the bill will likely cause a decrease in CDS
transactions because of the tax. The CDS transaction tax will increase the
cost of each CDS and decrease the benefit of each CDS to the parties.
Therefore, the tax will likely reduce the total number of CDSs traded in the
marketplace. However beneficial this may actually be to the financial
markets, if at all, the largest problem with the CDS market is its
opaqueness, not the lack of taxation. This bill fails to address the most
prevalent concern of the CDS market, regulatory authority and oversight
regarding the transactions.
H. Derivatives Trading Accountability and Disclosure Act of 2009
Representative McMahon introduced the Derivatives Trading
Accountability and Disclosure Act of 2009 (DTADA of 2009) to the House
of Representatives on July 22, 2009.332 The DTADA of 2009 plans "[t]o
provide increased transparency and regulatory requirements for the trading
of certain derivative financial instruments. 333 The bill states that the lack
of CDS regulation and the problems with effectively identifying the value
and risks of CDSs led to the near collapse of AIG in 2008. 334
Section 3 of the DTADA of 2009 creates a new office within the U.S.
Treasury Department, the Office of Derivatives Supervision (ODS). 335 The
ODS will oversee the registration of all derivatives traders and will assist in
coordinating the SEC's and the CFTC's activities in developing regulations
for the buying and selling of derivative instruments.336 The ODS will
assimilate substantive regulations for economically equivalent instruments
332. Derivatives Trading Accountability and Disclosure Act of 2009, H.R. 3300, 111 th Cong.
(2009).
333. Id.
334. Id. § l(b)(6).
335. H.R. 3300, supra note 332, at § 3(a).
336. Id. at § 3(b)(1)-(2).
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and require the development of consistent procedures for reviewing and
approving proposals for new products and rulemakings by self-regulatory
organizations.337 Further, the ODS will have the authority to disapprove
any regulation set by the SEC or CFTC within thirty days of the
recommendation for such new regulation.338
Furthermore in Section 3, the ODS will be required to prepare and
report to Congress regarding all the laws enacted under this bill, an
evaluation of the numbers, percentage, volume, and exposure of derivative
instruments that are traded on exchanges, cleared through any
clearinghouse, or traded in the OTC market, and an assessment of changes
to other laws related to the derivatives market.
339
Section 4 requires that all derivative traders must register with the
ODS. 340 Also, the Secretary of the Treasury, acting through the ODS and
after consulting the CFTC and SEC, may exempt a derivatives trader from
needing to register with the ODS, or the ODS may temporary suspend a
trader's registration.341 The Secretary of the Treasury has the discretion to
determine if a derivatives trader shall be granted or denied such registration
necessary to trade in the market.
342
Also included in Section 4, the Secretary of the Treasury "shall
censure, place limitations on the activities, functions, or operations of,
suspend for a period not exceeding 12 months, or revoke the registration of
any derivatives trader" if the Secretary of the Treasury finds it to be in the
public's interest, given certain conditions are met as listed in this bill.343
Until the determination of whether a permanent revocation of a derivative
trader's registration is proper, the Secretary of the Treasury may temporary
suspend the registration until a final decision is made, if the temporary
suspension is in the interests of the public and investors.3"
Section 5 outlines the rulemaking authority regarding the derivatives
market.345 The SEC and the CFTC will have the authority to issue
regulations regarding disclosure and transparency requirements, including
an audit trail of the record of trading, anti-fraud and truth-in-marketing
requirements, mandatory minimum initial margin requirements, mandatory
337. Id. § 3(b)(2).
338. Id. § 3(b)(4)(A).
339. Id. § 3(c).
340. H.R. 3300, supra note 332, at § 4.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. H.R. 3300, supra note 332, at § 5.
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minimum variation margin requirements, and acceptable or permissible
types of collateral.346
Requirements placed on the derivatives market by the SEC and the
CFTC will be based on the potential systemic risk posed by the derivative
transaction and the extent to which the derivative instrument is
customized.347 Customization of the instrument requires an analysis of the
volume of transactions involving the instrument, the similarity of terms
between the instrument and other instruments that are more standardized in
the industry, whether the differences between the terms of the instrument
and standardized instruments are of an economic significance, and the
extent to which the terms are distributed to third parties.348
The SEC and the CFTC, in coordination with the ODS, will determine
which derivatives will be traded on an exchange, which will be traded
through a clearinghouse, and which derivatives will be traded on the OTC
market.3 49 The bill states that all standardized derivatives shall be permitted
to be traded on exchanges, all standardized derivatives between major
market participants shall be traded through clearinghouses, and all
derivatives not traded through an exchange or a clearinghouse shall be
traded through an OTC trade depository.350 Furthermore, all CDS
transactions will be required to meet all the transparency, recordkeeping,
anti-fraud, and disclosure requirements regardless of how the transaction is
executed. 35' The SEC and the CFTC have authority to set margin and
collateral requirements in relation to the systemic risk posed by the entity
and type of derivative transaction; the more systemic risk the greater the
margin and collateral requirements.352
Lastly, Section 10 of the DTADA of 2009 establishes an international
working group under the dominion of the ODS.353 The working group is to
analyze the international regulations regarding the harmonization of
substantive commodity, securities, and derivative laws.354 The United
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. H.R. 3300, supra note 332, at § 6.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See id.
353. H.R. 3300, supra note 332, at § 10.
354. Id.
Dutt
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
States' representation in this international working group will consist of
three persons; one person from the ODS, SEC, and CFTC.3 5
The bill establishes a new federal agency that will have to work in
tandem with the other federal agencies to develop and enforce CDS
regulations. Rather than create one federal agency empowered to monitor
and regulate all aspects of financial markets, like accomplished in the
United Kingdom, the bill adds a new regulator into the current mix of
federal regulators within the Unites States. So while the ODS has the
authority to strictly regulate the CDS market, an additional federal agency
may restrain the efficiency of the regulations because of the coordination
required for several large bureaucratic entities to effectively administer the
law cohesively.
Although the efficiency of regulation may remain unchanged, or even
decrease, with the addition of another federal agency, the ODS, SEC, and
CFTC are given great deference regarding the creation and implementation
of CDS marketplace regulations. As long as these three federal regulators
can work in tandem and complement one another's actions, this bill will
likely be the first of many federal actions taken to regulate CDS trading,
and may be highly productive in doing so.
None of these eight aforementioned pending U.S. congressional laws
will absolutely solve the regulatory problems of the current CDS market;
however, they are a step in the right direction. Each bill proposes positive
initiatives to regulate this opaque market, yet each bill also possesses flaws.
Perhaps, only by trial and error of implementing and retracting partial CDS
market regulation over time will the U.S. domestic regulatory regime
administer effective and efficient CDS regulations that the rest of the world
will adopt and enforce.
VIII. AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS
The first and most important step in regulating the CDS market is to
create one, efficient federal financial market regulator. By combining
federal regulatory agencies like the OCC, OTS, FDIC, SEC, and CFTC to
create one entity, two vital goals can be achieved. First, the United States
will have one, authoritative agency that can implement, monitor, and
enforce any and all CDS regulations. The current battle between federal
agencies for regulatory power is highly unproductive. Also, the current
issue of which agency has legal authority over the CDS market will be
eliminated, removing regulatory gaps or overlaps while saving resources
and promoting efficiency. Second, the United States is the world financial
leader. In order for the United States to forge international cooperation and
355. Id.
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endorse new, international CDS regulatory standards, the United States
needs one, coherent voice. Having an organized, efficient, and powerful
financial regulator, the United States can ensure the development of CDS
regulation in the international community, thus avoiding regulatory
arbitrage by CDS market participants.
Therefore, the argument that CDSs should be considered insurance and
thus regulated by state insurance regulatory agencies is impracticable.
Regulating a financial instrument that is commonly traded among large,
international corporations with most transactions spanning national borders
by state agencies is a counterintuitive approach. Rather, CDSs require a
national standard because implementing international regulation is difficult
as is, yet dividing the United States into more than fifty jurisdictions will
only make international regulation of the CDS market more complicated
and less probable to occur.
Having a limited number of CDS clearinghouses is the next move for
efficient CDS regulation. Clearinghouses will bring transparency and
standardization to a cloudy market. The clearinghouses will need to require
a margin deposit from each CDS party. By requiring every party to post
money upfront in order to complete the transaction, the clearinghouses can
ensure that the parties maintain a certain level of cash reserves in case of a
CDS default. Further, the clearinghouses can gather the margins or collect
an additional fee to create a capital reserve of their own as further
protection in the event a party defaults on a CDS. Margins and capital
reserves will promote market liquidity, especially in times of economic
downturn. However, in order for the clearinghouses to truly reduce
counterparty and systemic risks, the clearinghouses must accurately value
the parties' risk of default to set the correct margin amounts. If the
clearinghouses fail to accurately value counterparty and systemic risks, the
clearinghouses will fail to reduce risk, and may even aggravate certain
risks.
The clearinghouses will serve as an entity that can collect, organize,
and report data on CDS transactions, parties, and the market as a whole. By
requiring that all CDS transactions be recorded with a clearinghouse, all
CDS transaction data will be concentrated at a few entities. The
clearinghouses will be capable of aggregating the data and reporting it to
the federal regulator, as well as publishing the data for use by investors.
Having data on all CDS transactions will greatly increase market
transparency, which will improve the accuracy of valuing credit risks.
Regulators can efficiently track and monitor all entities involved in the CDS
market, and also track and monitor each CDS contract currently
outstanding.
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Because CDSs are customized contracts designed to suit the parties'
specific needs, standardized CDS contracts should not be mandated. The
current system, by which the parties may choose certain terms from a given
list, permits parties to a CDS to tailor the contract to the given situation and
parties' needs. However, by mandating that all CDS transactions be cleared
or recorded through a clearinghouse, the market will pick and choose the
most valuable and efficient terms in order to decrease transaction costs.
Thus, market participants will decide the best terms of a CDS given all
parties must transact through a clearinghouse.
Nevertheless, legal definitions used in the CDSs should be determined
and enforced by the federal regulator. For example, the parties can
determine which type of event will constitute the credit event within the
CDS, but the federal regulators have a standard, legal definition of what a
credit event can or cannot include. Forcing all CDSs to be a standardized
contract will greatly limit the benefit of these contracts and may even drive
the market into impracticability.
Rather, leave the market some freedom to customize the contracts but
require all transactions to be recorded through a clearinghouse. This will
ensure all parties post the margin requirement and that the party is a
registered CDS participant. Also, the clearinghouse has the ability to
increase the margin for more customized contracts because these highly
customized CDSs are less liquid. The federal regulator should have the
authority to demand that all clearinghouses and potential parties register
with the agency. The regulator will have the authority to set standards by
which each party and clearinghouse must meet in order to operate within
the CDS market. Not only will the regulator be able to monitor all CDS
transactions through the clearinghouse, it will also have the ability to
monitor any CDS party's financial records and accounting books.
The netting of CDS transactions should be required and enforced by
the clearinghouses because netting will reduce the notional amount due
upon settlement, reducing the risk that a party cannot pay the settlement
amount, and also reducing the number and total cost of CDS transactions.
Also, any type of transfer, sale, novation, or cancellation of a CDS contract
should not be legal unless both parties agree to the given transaction and the
transaction is recorded with a clearinghouse or directly with the federal
regulator. This eliminates the parties' ability to trade CDSs without the
regulator's knowledge.
The number of clearinghouses should be limited. Somewhere between
three and five clearinghouses should be optimal. A large number of
clearinghouses pose several problems. First, the more clearinghouses, the
more dispersed the data and the more difficult it is for the federal regulator
to collect, organize, and monitor the information and the actions of the
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clearinghouses and market participants. Second, clearinghouses need to
attract varied types of parties in order to collect a proper amount in margin
and collateral requirements to efficiently disperse the risk of default among
many parties. Therefore, the clearinghouses need to attract a certain
amount of CDS transactions in order to reduce systemic risk by collecting a
significant amount of money from these transactions so to efficiently spread
risk among all market participants. Finally, the more clearinghouses spread
throughout the world, the more resources the international community will
need to consume to monitor these facilities.
Also, if a nation fails to adopt the same CDS regulations as the
international standard embraces, parties may direct trades through the less
regulated facilities. Thus, a small number of clearinghouses located in
jurisdictions with very similar, if not the same, CDS regulatory structures
will ensure the most efficient collection, organization, and monitoring of
the CDS market by forcing all CDS transactions through a legal regime
with high levels of oversight.
As to "naked" CDSs, these speculative trades should not be treated as
gambling and thus illegal because they benefit the market with increased
liquidity and price accuracy of the underlying reference assets, obligations,
or entities and credit risk. Speculation can cause problems in any market,
but there are several steps that can be implemented to mitigate the costs of
"naked" CDS transactions while increasing their benefits.
The clearinghouses will ensure that all speculative CDS transactions
are recorded and meet the margin requirements. Speculative positions will
be treated the same as hedging positions in regards to the clearinghouse
transaction costs and margins. For example, a speculator in the current
market with $10 million can purchase ten $1 million "naked" CDSs. But if
the speculator needs to post a twenty percent margin per contract, plus pay
clearinghouse fees of five percent of the contract value, the speculator can
now purchase eight $1 million "naked" CDSs. Having to clear the CDS
through a clearinghouse and post a margin will reduce the number of
"naked" CDSs in the market because a speculation position is not nearly as
cost-effective as they are in the current, unregulated market. Naturally, the
mandate of clearinghouses for all CDS transactions will limit the amount of
CDS contracts outstanding throughout the marketplace. Furthermore,
"naked" CDS transactions make heavy use of standardized CDS contracts,
ensuring that "naked" CDSs will be transacted through a clearinghouse.
If parties want to enter a CDS where neither party owns the underlying
reference asset, the CDS contract cannot be physically settled, only cash
settlement. By requiring "naked" CDSs to be cash settled, these
transactions or defaults will not artificially affect the market for the
underlying reference asset. This problem arose in the Delphi Corporation
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bankruptcy discussed earlier because "naked" CDS holders had to enter the
market to buy a large amount of Delphi bonds in order to fulfill the physical
settlement requirement for a CDS default. Requiring cash settlements for
all "naked" CDS positions will completely avoid the speculators need to
buy and sell the reference obligations to fulfill the CDS contract settlement;
protecting the market from artificial price movements that threaten
investors and financial markets.
As a last resort, the federal regulator should have the authority to
intervene in the CDS market in order to protect investors and avoid market
fraud or manipulation. A set of standards for this intervention would need
to be determined, but the basic idea is that the federal regulator, upon
gathering some level of proof, can suspend, limit, or terminate an entity's
ability to transact in the CDS market. Further, the federal regulator can
suspend, limit, or terminate a single CDS transaction or group of CDS
contracts. The regulator's ability to intervene is exceedingly important
when the underlying reference entity is experiencing financial difficulties
because CDS holders will have an incentive to see the entity fail in order to
trigger a credit event. However, this regulatory interference should be used
as a last resort form of market protection and not as a way to illegalize all
CDS transactions.
One final recommendation would require all entities holding CDS
contracts to submit a quarterly disclosure to the federal regulator in which
the disclosure accounts for every current CDS position in addition to all
CDS positions held within the previous five years. The new disclosure
would include, inter alia, the price paid for the CDS, the current fair value
of the CDS, the cash flows due to the CDS position, all parties to the CDS,
the reference entity and obligation, and the probability the credit event
occurs. Further, the CDS holder would be required to explain the numbers
disclosed in a narrative format, such as why the entity entered into the CDS,
how the entity evaluates and balances the risks of the CDS, how the CDS
could affect the financial health of the company, how the company
calculated the probability of the credit event occurrence, and explain the
effects of previous CDSs on the company's financial health. The increased
accounting standards would give the federal regulator information, beyond
that received from the clearinghouses, to monitor CDS transactions and
each entity's exposure in the market. Information directly from the CDS
holders will assist the regulator to locate and control market manipulations
and give the regulator a backdrop for future regulatory initiatives.
IX. CONCLUSION
Until the recent financial crisis, CDSs flew under the radar of
regulatory agencies and did not gain much of the public's attention. This
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lack of regulation was guaranteed by federal statutes, which kept the market
largely opaque and seemingly non-toxic. However, recent discourse has
shown the concern held by financial professionals, regulators, academics,
politicians, and the public at large regarding CDS transactions. While the
U.S. Congress is currently deliberating eight potential laws, none of these
eight proposals will solve the currently regulatory gap that the CDS market
symbolizes. These eight are a sufficient start for building U.S. CDS
regulation, but the CDS market requires more domestic regulation than
these bills propose, plus additional international regulations that work
cohesively with the domestic initiatives.
Because the CDS market is truly international with no regard to
national borders, the U.S. regulation of the market should reflect this
characteristic. Therefore, CDS regulation requires more than a federal law
or two, but rather a complete regulatory overhaul with a considerable
demand for increased informational disclosure. The world continues to
look toward the United States for guidance regarding financial markets and
investment practices. If the United States does not set a standard which
other countries of the world are able and willing to adopt, regulation of
CDSs will remain a fictional narrative. Countries that do not adopt
regulation will receive an influx of CDS transactions while countries with
regulation will see a CDS contraction; so the risks created by CDSs will
remain unfettered and flourishing in new host countries. Therefore, the
United States must create efficient regulatory standards that the global body
politic will adopt and enforce.
CDSs are a very beneficial financial tool for companies that want to
reduce credit risk exposure. Their potential to spread risk and increase
capital access is abundant, but they can also cause serious economic
problems if not used and regulated effectively. Establishing a regulatory
system, like the one mentioned in this Note, will protect the benefits of
CDSs while curtailing the market abuses of recent years, assuring the CDS
market has a worthy, productive future.
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